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Privatizing the Patriot Act:
The Criminalization of Environmental
and Animal Protectionists
As Terrorists
ETHAN CARSON EDDY1
Since President Bush signed the USA Patriot Act 2 into law on
November 26, 2001, more than 357 legislative bodies, including
four states, have passed resolutions condemning the law's en-
croachment upon civil liberties. 3 The Maine legislature, for exam-
ple, found the USA Patriot Act so fearsome that it resolved, in the
Act's wake, to "reaffirm [its] sworn oaths to defend" its citizens'
"freedom of expression [and] ... freedom of association, including
the ability to attend meetings without being monitored or belong
to an organization without fear of reprisal. ' 4 The State of Hawai'i
urged its Congressional delegation to work to repeal the USA Pa-
triot Act, recalling that many of its residents, during World War II
and the Japanese internment, had "experienced first hand the
dangers of unbalanced pursuit of security without appropriate
checks and balances for the protection of basic liberties."5
Despite the outpouring of condemnation from anxious state
and local governments, at least thirteen state legislatures, includ-
ing that of Hawaii, have either passed or are currently considering
1. The author is a December 2004 graduate of the concurrent JD/MPH program
between Northeastern University School of Law and Tufts University School of
Medicine. He wishes to thank Professor Wendy Parmet, Professor Taylor Flynn, Em-
ily Read, and Tobin, Margaret, and Garrison O'Brien.
2. The USA Patriot Act is the labored acronym for the Uniting and Strengthen-
ing America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at titles 8,
12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 of the United States Code).
3. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) maintains on its website a tally
of jurisdictions that have passed resolutions expressing disapproval of the USA Pa-
triot Act. See ACLU http://www.aclu.orglSafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11294&
c=207 (last modified September 29, 2004). The four states that have condemned the
USA Patriot Act as of November, 2004 are Alaska, Hawai'i, Maine, and Vermont. Id.
4. H.R. Res., 121st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Me. 2003).
5. S. Con. Res. 18, 22d Leg. (Haw. 2003).
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versions or parts of a model bill6 that borrows the legal framework
of the USA Patriot Act and manipulates its anti-terror rhetoric to
wage an even broader offensive against civil liberties. These so-
called Animal and Ecological Terrorism bills would make it a fel-
ony to, among other things, "deter" the business activities of in-
dustries engaged in the exploitation of animals and natural
resources by "protest[ing] the actions of a... corporation" or "in-
fluenc[ing] a unit of government to take a specific action."7 Al-
though the bills also address a range of destructive activities,
these other provisions are merely a reiteration of existing state
criminal codes." Accordingly, these bills' only real contribution to
the black-letter law is to confer bald economic protectionism upon
their drafters and chief proponents - a limited set of favored busi-
ness enterprises - by criminalizing speech acts that are critical of
their practices.
Part I of this Article describes the model Animal and Ecologi-
cal Terrorism Act (hereinafter the Model Act), its permutations
currently pending in state legislatures, its proponents, and their
motivations. Part I also explains the legal and rhetorical parallels
between the Model Act and the USA Patriot Act. Part II of this
Article predicts that courts will find the bills' constraints on
speech to be undeniably content-based and without a sufficiently
compelling state interest. Part II also predicts that should any of
the bills become law, they will not withstand First Amendment
scrutiny in actions brought in federal courts, as they are both
vague and overbroad.
Part III situates these bills within the long and familiar his-
tory of restraints on speech in the name of both public and private
interests. Although federal and state governments have histori-
cally placed civilly and criminally enforceable restraints on speech
in the name of private economic interests and national security,
respectively, this Article argues that the bills represent a signifi-
cant departure from their historical antecedents, in that they
6. See American Legislative Exchange Council, Animal & Ecological Terrorism
in America, available at http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTer-
rorisminAmerica.pdf (2003) [hereinafter ALEC]. A nearly identical draft of the model
bill has been published by the U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance. See U.S. Sportsmen's Alli-
ance, The Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act, at http://www.wlfa.orglinteractive/
features/read.cfm?ID=1129 (last visited July 13, 2004).
7. ALEC, supra note 6, §§ 2(D), 2(N), 3(A)(1)(a). A felony sentence is triggered if
violation of the Act results in a loss of more than $500 to the affected business entity.
Id. § 4(B).
8. See infra text accompanying note 26.
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mark the first time that speech activity has been criminalized in
the name of private economic interests.9 Moreover, to the extent
that the bills draw upon or incorporate the specific legal standards
expressed in each of the historical constraints, this Article argues
that every time, the particular doctrine has been manipulated or
misapplied.
Part IV explains how the bills exploit the USA Patriot Act's
anti-terrorism rhetoric, while in fact detracting and distracting
from efforts to deter the actions of other domestic groups that
have already killed and injured hundreds of Americans. Part IV
also demonstrates that the bills reveal a concerted corporate strat-
egy to manipulate the term "terrorist" and capitalize on its po-
tency, in an anticompetitive effort to secure protectionism from
the adverse economic effects of criticism, protests, and boycotts.
I. THE MODEL ANIMAL AND ECOLOGICAL
TERRORIST ACT AND ITS PROGENY IN THE
STATE LEGISLATURES
A. Construction of the Model Act's Primary Provision:
What Does it Mean to "Deter" Business or "Coerce"
Consumers?
The Model Act, broadly stated, is designed to prohibit envi-
ronmental and animal rights activists from interfering with the
companies whose corporate practices they would seek to change. 10
The crux of the constitutional issues presented by the Model Act is
what one means by interference. Unlawful, destructive activity
such as sabotaging logging equipment interferes with business,
but so does the presence of two handbillers outside a store. In its
present state, the law distinguishes between the two, punishing
one while protecting the other as free speech." The Model Act
and its permutations in the states, however, would blur this care-
fully wrought distinction and criminalize both, by using vague,
undefined terms such as "deter," "obstruct," "coerce," "influence,"
9. The single exception to this pattern, as explained in Part III infra, is Colo-
rado's agricultural disparagement law, which makes it a crime to "knowingly .. .
make any materially false statement" regarding an agricultural product. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 35-31-101 (West 2004). According to the author's search, Colorado's is
the only agricultural disparagement law that provides criminal sanctions. Id. A
search of both reported and published but not reported cases reveals that it has never
been invoked.
10. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3A.
11. Id., § 3(A)(2).
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and "impede" to describe the prohibited interference. 12 In section
3(A)(1) of the Model Act, for example, this prohibition - the Model
Act's primary provision - reads:
Depriving the owner of an animal or natural resource by ...
obstructing the lawful use of an animal, natural resource or
other property from the owner permanently or for such a period
of time that a significant portion of the value or enjoyment of
the animal, natural resource or property is lost to the owner by
way of coercion, fear, intimidation, or property damage. 13
The New York bill is nearly identical, but it substitutes the even
more vague "deter" for the word "obstruct" in the Model Act. 14 In
the Oklahoma version of the Model Act, which has already been
signed into law, the operative term is "disrupt."
15
Regardless of the synonym used to describe the prohibited in-
terference with favored business interests, the Model Act and its
bills leave these key operative terms undefined. The only other
section of the Model Act that provides any context for how terms
like "coerce" and "deter" should be interpreted confirms that its
drafters intended the Model Act to reach to the very core of pro-
tected speech activities. Section (N) of the definitions section,
which designates certain activity as "politically motivated," indi-
cates that the proscribed "depriv[ation]" of a business interest can
also occur vis A vis:
12. Indeed, the terms "obstruct," "deter," and "impede" are used interchangeably
even within the Model Act. ALEC, supra note 6. Subsection D of the definitions sec-
tion, which defines an "animal or ecological terrorist organization," groups the word
.obstruct" together with the words "impede" and "deter" when describing the effect of
the proscribed action upon the protected business entity. Id. § 2(D). When paired with
section 3(A)(1), this subsection has the effect of criminalizing an entire range of activ-
ity, some of which need not involve physical obstruction. See id. §§ 2(D), 3(A)(1). Sub-
section D reads:
"Animal or ecological terrorist organization" means any association, or-
ganization, entity, coalition, or combination of two or more persons with
the primary or incidental purpose of supporting any ["politically moti-
vated"] activity through intimidation, coercion, force, or fear that is in-
tended to obstruct, impede or deter any person from participating in a
lawful animal activity, animal facility, research facility, or the lawful ac-
tivity of mining, foresting, harvesting, gathering or processing natural
resources.
Id. § 2(D) (emphasis added).
13. Id. § 3(A)(1). Note the parallel construction between this subsection and sec-
tion 2(D), quoted supra note 12.
14. A. 4884 / S. 2996, 226th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
15. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 5-105 (West 2003).
[Vol. 22264
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/3
2005] PRIVATIZING THE PATRIOT ACT 265
any activity where the principal purpose is to influence a unit of
government to take a specific action or to persuade the public to
take specific action, or to protest the actions of a unit of govern-
ment, corporation, organization or the public at large.16
Accordingly, the Model Act prohibits these politically motivated
speech acts where the actor's intent is to deter or obstruct the pro-
tected business activity, or when the actor's "intent to commit the
deterring activity was politically motivated." 17 It should be imme-
diately apparent that each of these prohibited "politically moti-
vated" activities is a constitutionally protected speech action.
Indeed, the opportunity for citizens to influence their government
is a core function of all working democracies, if not in fact a civic
duty.
Whether politically motivated or not, as history demon-
strates, "coercion" can be accomplished by many modalities, in-
cluding brute force, threats of brute force, the mere presence of
picketers or protesters, or even the verbal transmission of a
speaker's opinion.18 As explained further in Part II, "coercion"
16. ALEC, supra note 6, § 2(N) (emphasis added).
17. Id. § 3(A).
18. As explained further in Part II, the Model Act and its progeny could be con-
strued to reach speech acts and related conduct which are not fully protected by the
First Amendment, such as incitement or protest activity that is disruptive of public
order, obscene, or otherwise violates a legitimate exercise of a municipality's police
power, such as a time, place or manner restriction. However, this Article limits its
primary analysis to the impact of the Model Act upon speech acts that currently enjoy
the First Amendment's full protection, such as "political speech" or the attempt to
influence or participate in one's government. The Model Act prohibits non-violent
consumer protests that, by design, do not include extortion, threats, hate speech, so-
called "fighting words," or other incendiary modes of speech not fully protected by the
First Amendment. Part II infra more fully explains how the Model Act does not limit
itself to merely time, place and manner restrictions, but rather polices a broad range
of conduct, some historically protected by the First Amendment, some not.
The "speech/conduct distinction" is immaterial here because the Model Act, by its
very terms, regulates the communicative content of the speech act, as measured by its
financial impact on the protected business. By contrast, courts applying the speech/
conduct distinction in constitutional challenges to anti-panhandling ordinances, for
example, often upheld the ordinances, finding that panhandling "'do[es] not necessa-
rily involve the communication of information or opinion."' Stephanie M. Kaufman,
The Speech/Conduct Distinction and First Amendment Protection of Begging in Sub-
ways, 79 GEO. L.J. 1803, 1806 (1991) (quoting Ulmer v. Municipal Court, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). Even if the Model Act could be read to constrain
conduct only, which is a strained reading at best, it must be remembered that "much
speech is accompanied by action, and courts have afforded strict first amendment pro-
tection to many completely nonverbal acts in recognition of their expressive value."
Id. at 1821 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969)).
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that results from violence and extortion is rightfully prohibited by
legislative bodies, while "coercion" that results from non-threaten-
ing speech and picketing activities has been expressly afforded
First Amendment protection by the Supreme Court.19 Courts ob-
serve this distinction because they recognize that some of this "co-
ercion" might better be understood as mere "persuasion,"20 which
is a lawful byproduct of protected speech activity.21 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court admonished in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,
"[sipeech does not lose its protected character.., simply because
it may embarrass others or coerce them into action."22
The Model Act, however, does not adhere to this distinction.
Had its drafters intended its scope to reach only violent or extor-
tionate conduct, they could have explicitly stated so, rather than
using vague and open-ended terms like "deter" without aids of
construction. Of equal importance, the Model Act also fails to
specify whose coercion or deterrence is prohibited - that of the
protected business entity or a third party such as a consumer. Ac-
cordingly, this Article understands the term "coercion," as used in
the Model Act, to embody a range of speech acts, including, most
importantly, the attempt and completion of the following three-
step process: (1) the speaker transmits her opinion to the listener;
(2) the listener receives the message, and consciously or subcon-
sciously, the message evokes an attitude change in the listener
toward the subject matter; and (3) the listener alters his behavior
based on this attitude change. In the context of protest and boy-
cott activity, the behavior change at issue is the severance or dis-
ruption of the consumer relationship with the protected business
interest. The consumer who decides of her own free will not to
consume certain products has thus been "coerced" as the term is
configured in the Model Act.
The Model Act's definitions of "animal facility" and "animal
activities" also make it clear that the drafters intend to target or-
dinary consumer protests.23 For example, "animal facility" is de-
fined broadly to include not just facilities where animals are kept,
but any environment "involving the use of animals or animal
19. Speech and picketing are, of course, still subject to "time, place, and manner"
restrictions so long as the proscriptions are not based on the content of the message.
See discussion infra Part III.
20. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 335-46 (1991).
21. Id.
22. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (emphasis added).
23. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 2(B)-(C).
[Vol. 22266
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parts,"24 such as a restaurant or retail store. Moreover, the key
provisions of the Model Act are not limited to deterrent activity
that occurs on private property, or anywhere near the actual busi-
ness premises. 25 To be sure, the Model Act also prohibits theft,26
property damage, 27 and trespass,28 but these acts are already
criminalized under state and federal criminal codes.
In the context of the consumer protests clearly contemplated
by the Model Act, "coercion" derives solely from the content of the
speech, or the expressive effect of a physical gathering of people in
a public forum; its measure is the effect on the listener's decision-
making as reflected by the protected business interests' concomi-
tant profit losses. The proscribed attitude and behavior changes
come about from an exchange of information, and not spoken (or
unspoken) threats, as in several of the early labor protest cases
discussed in Part III below. As explained further in Part II, all
protest activity, by its very nature, is "coercive" in that it attempts
to "deter" the controversial action.
Accordingly, one need not engage in semantic acrobatics to
read the Model Act as attempting to criminalize, on its face, lawful
protest or boycott activity which has the effect of "deter[ring]" the
activities of the protected business interest. Passing out handbills
regarding the suffering of intensively confined farm animals, for
instance, may deter business by influencing would-be consumers
24. Id. § 2(C).
25. The chief exception to this, as explained infra in Part I.B, is certain parts of
the felony photography provision, which requires the entry of the actor onto the busi-
ness premises. However, as explained below, even this provision is not wholly con-
strained to activities occurring on private property, as some "animal facility[ies]" are
located on public property, such as a petting zoo at a municipal park. See ALEC,
supra note 6, § 2(C).
26. See id. § 3(A)(1)(b). This provision prohibits "taking or detaining the animal,
natural resource or other property and agreeing to restore it only upon reward or
other compensation." In New York, for example, this conduct would be prohibited
under N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 155.00 -.45 (Consol. 2004).
27. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(2)(a), which prohibits "damaging or destroying
an animal or research facility, or other property in or on the premises." This activity
is basically criminalized under section 378 of New York's Agriculture and Markets
Law, N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 378 (Consol. 2004), as well as N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 145.25 (Consol. 2004).
28. See ALEC, supra note 6, §§ 3(A)(2)(b), (f), which makes it unlawful to "ente[r]
an animal or research facility that is at the time closed to the public," or to "ente[r] or
remai [n] on the premises of an animal or research facility if the person or organiza-
tion: (i) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or, (ii) received notice to depart but
failed to do so." Again, by way of example, New York already forbids this conduct
under the trespass prohibitions in its Penal Law. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.00 - .17
(Consol. 2004).
2005] 267
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to choose a different product. The Model Act would make this ac-
tion a felony if the protected enterprise lost more than $500 in
revenue.29 In sum, without explicit statutory definitions to aid
courts in their interpretation and circumscription of these terms,
the Model Act and its bills criminalize a seemingly limitless range
of conduct, including protected speech activity. 30
B. Other Controversial Provisions: The Felony
Photography Prohibition and the Institutional
Liability or Membership Provision
Another controversial provision of the Model Act is section
3(A)(2)(e), a felony prohibition against "entering an animal or re-
search facility to take pictures by photography, video camera, or
other means with the intent to . . .defame the facility or its
owner," even when such entry is lawful. 31 It follows that a paying
circus-goer, for example, who happens to witness acts of animal
abuse during a performance and documents those events with a
camera, may be subject to felony prosecution depending on how
those images are ultimately used.32 By criminalizing the intent to
29. See ALEC, supra note 6, §§ 3(A)(3), 4(B).
30. Lest one surmise that these key definitions were omitted as an act of hasty or
wanting draftsmanship, bear in mind that ALEC, the drafter, is an unusually effec-
tive lawmaking machine. ALEC boasts that 450 of the 3,100 bills introduced by its
member lawmakers during the 1999-2000 political term were signed into law -
roughly 15 percent. At times ALEC's passage rate has been as high as 38 percent.
See Defenders of Wildlife & Natural Resources Defense Council, Corporate America's
Trojan Horse in the States: The Untold Story Behind the American Legislative Ex-
change Council 39, at http://www.alecwatch.org/l11223344.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2005) [hereinafter Defenders of Wildlife]. This is many times the average bill passage
rate, as demonstrated by a recent legislative session in Kentucky during which only
two of the more than 1,000 bills introduced were sent to the Governor. See Al Cross,
2004 Kentucky General Assembly: Legislature Handling Fewer Bills, Blaming Politics,
Budget Woes, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 2, 2004, at 1A. Further discus-
sion of ALEC follows infra in Part I.E.
31. Although § 3(A)(2)(e) prohibits "obstructing or impeding the use of an animal
facility or the use of a natural resource without the effective consent of the owner by:
entering an animal facility to take pictures," this includes lawful entry, such as that
of an invitee, because the "consent" required goes to the obstruction or impeding, not
to the entry itself.
32. The implications of these provisions for journalists are obvious. For example,
when Tyke the elephant escaped from her confines in 1994, killing one of her Circus
International handlers and injuring a dozen spectators, journalists arrived on the
scene in time to record Tyke being shot over 100 times and finally killed by Honolulu
police officers on the street abutting the circus arena. A picture of Tyke being shot by
Honolulu police appears at http://www.petatv.com/tvpopup/video.asp?video=circusele-
phants&Player=wm&speed= med (last visited May 15, 2005). An elephant who es-
capes the circus is certainly still considered a part of the circus, rather than simply an
unowned wild animal at large. Because the physical boundaries of the "animal facil-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/3
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defame, the Model Act turns the concept of defamation, which has
its own demanding intent requirement, on its head.33 Most impor-
tantly, defamation has always been a civil action that sounds in
tort, not criminal law, "in light of the fundamental First Amend-
ment interests involved."34
The felony photography provision is no doubt designed to in-
sulate the protected business interests from the damaging effects
of undercover reporting. Such documentary efforts often capture
unlawful activity, triggering long overdue enforcement actions. 35
Neither the Model Act nor its progeny in the state legislatures has
a journalist exception to the felony photography provision, despite
the fact that it proscribes conduct following lawful entry. In fact,
Arizona Senate Bill 1081, which was passed by the legislature but
ultimately vetoed by Governor Napolitano, did not contain an ex-
ception for law enforcement authorities either. 36
ity" are not defined, this image, which was published with the intent of deterring
circus attendance, may violate the law proposed in H.B. 2550, which was filed on
January 2, 2004 in the Hawai'i legislature.
33. Defamation is explored more fully in Part III.B.4 infra, in the context of the
state agricultural disparagement statutes made famous by the cattle industry's 1996
lawsuit against Oprah Winfrey.
34. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Legal Is-
sues Pertaining to Animals, REPORT ON LEGISLATION: A. 4884, S. 2996, at 4, available
at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Animals%20-%20Terrorism.pdf (last visited July
13, 2004) [hereinafter ABCNY].
35. For instance, in 1997, an undercover journalist from a British television sta-
tion obtained employment at Huntingdon Life Sciences, an animal research facility,
and secretly filmed animal technicians mistreating laboratory dogs in violation of
animal welfare laws. The "most notorious sequence" caught on tape, which ultimately
led to the researchers' convictions on criminal animal abuse charges, occurred when
two researchers brutally and repeatedly punched a "terrified" four-month old beagle
"because it dared to struggle as a test injection was being administered." Eamonn
O'Neill, Hounded Out?, THE SCOTSMAN, Nov. 10, 2001, at 10. This expos6 was the
catalyst for a wave of enforcement actions by both British and American authorities,
leading them to cite Huntingdon for thirty-two violations of the U.S. Animal Welfare
Act and sixteen violations of the U.K. Good Laboratory Practice laws.
Such enforcement actions are rare, however. Given the enforcement agencies'
admitted reluctance to pursue violations, see Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., INNOVATIVE ENFORCEMENT: How USDA HAS USED NEW
TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES TO IMPROVE ITS ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE
ACT, available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/a/hammer.html (Nov. 1998), the press
and other private investigators play a pivotal and understated role in policing the
unlawful activities of businesses on private property.
36. See S. 1081, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004). This omission, which would
have essentially precluded enforcement of the state's anti-cruelty laws against busi-
nesses, may have prompted the veto. Without a law enforcement exception, S. 1081
would have prohibited a designated humane society officer from entering the business
premises to either investigate animal cruelty or impound injured or neglected
animals.
9
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Another controversial element of the bill is section 3(A)(3), the
membership clause or institutional liability provision. 37 This pro-
vision would make it a felony to donate money to or in any way
assist an organization that sponsors or conducts the prohibited de-
terring activity, regardless of whether the donor had any specific
knowledge or intent. Perhaps most troubling, donors or members
found guilty under the institutional liability provision would also
be added to a "Terrorist Registry" along with those who actually
participate in the deterring activity, and their names and photo-
graphs posted by the Attorney General on a state website for three
years or more.38
Indeed, the reach of this provision is so broad that a commit-
tee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York warned
that the definition of a terrorist organization could include the
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the
Sierra Club, and even the committee itself.39 In sum, without
straining the literal language of the Model Act, anyone who gives
money to a mainstream environmental or animal protection or-
ganization that in any way "deters]" a protected business activity
could be incarcerated and deemed a terrorist. This is cause for
great concern, as it brings within its reach a notable percentage of
the American public. 40
C. The State Bills
As of the 2003-2004 session in state legislatures, versions or
pieces of the Model Act have been introduced in at least thirteen
states, and several are still being actively considered.4 1 In New
37. The text of section 3(A)(3) appears infra in the text accompanying note 46.
38. ALEC, supra note 6, § 5.
39. ABCNY, supra note 34, at 2.
40. The Humane Society of the United States, for example, is one of many main-
stream organizations which could be said to "deter" certain animal enterprise be-
cause, among other things, it encourages members to use the legislative process to
secure more humane treatment for animals. See Humane Society of the United
States, Legislation and Laws, at http://www.hsus.org/legislation laws (last visited
Mar. 3, 2005). It has more than seven million members. Humane Society of the
United States, Member FAQ's- The HSUS, at http://www.hsus.org/about-us/member_
faqs/member-faqsjthe-hsus/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
41. See S. 993, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (signed into law); S. 584, 49th Sess.
(Okla. 2003); H.R. 433, 78th Leg. (Tex. 2003); S. 6114, 58th Leg., 2d Sess. (Wash.
2003); S.B. 1081, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004) (vetoed by Governor Napoli-
tano); H.R. 3518, 72d Leg. Assem. (Or. 2003); A. 4884 / S. 2996, 226th Ann. Legis.
Sess. (N.Y. 2003); H.R. 1176, 92d Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2004) (died when the
second session adjourned); S. 882, 92d Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2004) (differs from
H.R. 1176 in that it focuses on criminal penalties for undercover photography of
[Vol. 22270
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York, for example, Senate Bill 2996 mirrors the language of the
Model Act almost verbatim, but with a subtle linguistic twist that
confirms its drafters' intent to reach all types of conduct. It pro-
hibits the obstruction, impeding, or deterrence of the protected
business activity by criminalizing not only acts of "coercion," but
also acts that deter the protected activity via any "other means."
42
Accordingly, this bill proscribes an even broader range of speech
activity than protests that, while non-violent, could nonetheless
be described as deterring or coercive. Indeed, the term "other
means," by its very nature, is limitless.
Although the Model Act has yet to be passed in its full form,
several states have already passed parts of it into law. Oklahoma,
for example, now forbids certain undefined activities that "dis-
rupt" animal enterprises as a felony, punishable by a three year
imprisonment and $10,000 fine.43 Indiana's "Agricultural terror-
ism" statute, in contrast, penalizes conduct that is traditionally,
and more rationally, recognized as terrorism. It states simply:
A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) possesses; (2)
manufactures; (3) places; (4) disseminates; or (5) detonates; a
weapon of mass destruction with the intent to damage, destroy,
sicken or kill crops or livestock of another person without the
consent of the other person commits agricultural terrorism, a
Class C felony.44
Unlike the Model Act, its aim is not to confer economic protection
upon agribusiness per se. Rather, the Indiana statute protects
public health and safety from true terrorists who use the agricul-
tural infrastructure as a delivery mechanism for infectious patho-
gens and other harmful modalities. The Indiana statute more
closely parallels the federal definition of terrorism 45 in that it ad-
dresses destructive acts of a large scale, which, unlike isolated
animal enterprises); H.R. 5128, 93d Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2004); H.R. 2550, 22d Legis.
(Haw. 2004); S. 69, 2002 Leg. (Colo. 2002) (providing civil remedies for interference
with agricultural products; signed into law by Governor Owens); H.R. 4439, 115th
Leg. (S.C. 2003); S. 589, 2003 Sess. (Pa. 2003) (creating the crime of "environmental
harassment").
42. A. 4884 / S. 2996, 226th Ann. Legis. Sess. § l(J) (N.Y. 2003).
43. See S. 584, 49th Sess. (Okla. 2003), now codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2,
§§ 5-105, 106 (West 2004).
44. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-12-2 (Michie 2003).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2000), discussed infra in the text accompanying note
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protest activities, could have the effect of intimidating the govern-
ment or the civilian populace as a whole.
D. Using the USA Patriot Act as a Platform
In several ways, the Model Act functions as an industry-spe-
cific USA Patriot Act, by penalizing activity along all points of
what its drafters consider a "terrorist" infrastructure. In deciding
who is or is not a terrorist, for example, the Model Act employs
mechanisms familiar from the USA Patriot Act. Its organiza-
tional liability provision parallels the USA Patriot Act's prohibi-
tions on providing "material support" to alleged terrorists in
various ways. The Model Act prohibits:
raising, soliciting, collecting or providing any person with mate-
rial, financial support or other resources such as lodging, train-
ing, safe houses, false documentation or identification,
communications, equipment or transportation that will be used
in whole or in part, to encourage, plan, prepare, carry out, publi-
cize, promote or aid an act of animal or ecological terrorism.46
Likewise, section 805 of the USA Patriot Act prohibits individuals
from giving "material support for terrorism,"47 and section 806 au-
thorizes the seizure of all assets held by terrorist organizations or
alleged to be used for terrorist purposes. 48
As in the institutional liability provision of the USA Patriot
Act, the Model Act also lacks a specific intent requirement that
donors or members have specific knowledge that their actions con-
tribute directly to "terrorism." Commentators also warn that the
institutional liability provisions of the USA Patriot Act, like those
of the Model Act, "could classify as domestic terrorism any activity
[the government] found unpopular, including such legitimate ac-
tivist actions as labor union strikes and protests concerning abor-
tion rights, animal rights, civil rights, the environment, or the G-
4."49 The Model Act, however, goes one step further than the USA
Patriot Act, by affirmatively making that classification.
Although the Model Act does not specifically call for the sur-
render of organizations' membership lists, one can safely assume
that this would occur any time law enforcement authorities in-
46. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(3).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a).
49. Patricia Mell, Big Brother At the Door: Balancing National Security With Pri-
vacy Under the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 410 (2002).
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voked the organizational liability provision, in order to verify the
alleged membership connection. The USA Patriot Act similarly
invades citizens' personal and associational privacy, by authoriz-
ing wide ranging and deeply penetrating surveillance activities in
order to ascertain an individual's association with certain
organizations. 50
The impact of both laws upon freedoms of association is clear.
As a matter of common sense, if citizens are aware that member-
ship in or donating money to a cause puts them at risk for felony
anti-terror prosecution, they are far less likely to form those as-
sociations. These concerns are far from speculative. As we have
seen with the USA Patriot Act, law enforcement authorities have
actively used their enhanced surveillance authority to cast a wide
dragnet across the citizenry, snaring people with the most attenu-
ated connections to groups alleged to have financially supported
terrorist activity, regardless of their knowledge or intent.51 Those
who support humane organizations therefore have every right to
fear prosecution under the Model Act's institutional liability
provision.
However, unlike the Model Act, not even the USA Patriot Act
goes so far as to create a registry of those convicted as terrorists.
It is also curious that the Model Act parades under the banner of
anti-terrorism, while prohibiting only activities that are non-vio-
lent in nature, such as property damage, trespass, and theft.52
This departs from the long-standing federal definition of terror-
50. To this end, the USA Patriot Act amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the
Financial Right to Privacy Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Fam-
ily Education Rights and Privacy Act, and other sections of the United States Code
dealing with bank records, telephone communications, and library records. See id. at
393-95 (citing USA Patriot Act §§ 210, 504, 505(a)(2), 505(b), 505(c), 507).
51. For example, lawyer Brandon Mayfield, falsely accused by the federal govern-
ment of plotting the recent bombing of a train in Madrid, recently filed a suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the USA Patriot Act. See Noelle Crombie, Lawyer
Sues U.S. For Arrest In Bombing, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 5, 2004, at B1. The complaint
alleges that federal agents improperly searched his home under the USA Patriot Act's
expanded "sneak and peek" provisions. Id. The FBI used this enhanced surveillance
authority to collect evidence that Mayfield had once advertised his legal services in an
Islamic community publication owned by a man "suspected to have links to terror-
ism," and that his wife had once called a "branch of an Islamic charity" alleged to have
once received funds from another entity "suspected [ofi terrorist ties." Id. The May-
field case is a sobering example of how federal authorities have used the USA Patriot
Act's surveillance provisions to build attenuated inferential chains by which nearly
any targeted citizen could be deemed to have terrorist "ties."
52. Section 4(C) of the Model Act does include a sentence enhancement for crimes
resulting in injury or death, but the prohibitions themselves are limited to non-violent
activity. See ALEC, supra note 6.
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ism, as used in the USA Patriot Act, which is limited to activities
that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimi-
dation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. 53
As demonstrated in Parts L.A and B, the Model Act prohibits a
wide range of conduct, none of which can be remotely described as
either dangerous to human life or designed to intimidate the gov-
ernment or the civilian populace as a whole.5 4 Nor must the pro-
hibited conduct involve violent activities such as mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. 55 Rather, many of the
activists targeted by the Model Act only seek an audience with
consumers and policymakers, as with any other special interest
group.
5 6
Despite the overt similarities between the Model Act and the
USA Patriot Act, communities in all but two of the thirteen states
in which versions of the Model Act are pending have condemned
the USA Patriot Act as a threat to civil liberties. 57 That a state
legislature like Hawai'i's, which so passionately rebuked the USA
Patriot Act, would then entertain these bills demonstrates that
either the bills' supporters are misrepresenting their scope, or
that the legislatures' renewed commitment to civil liberties is not
as robust as it appears, but rather varies inversely with the
strength of the favored industries' lobby.
Finally, the very use of the word "terrorism" in the Model Act
to describe the prohibited activities owes much to the USA Patriot
Act and other recent federal anti-terror laws,58 which have in-
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (emphasis added).
54. See supra Part L.A-B; see also ALEC, supra note 6, § 3.
55. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 3.
56. See id.
57. South Carolina and Oklahoma are the exceptions. See ACLU, supra note 3.
58. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002);
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (the "Bioter-
ror Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002); Project Bioshield Act, Pub. L. No.
108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004). It should be noted that section 336 of the Bioterror Act
has an "Animal Enterprise Terrorism" provision that prohibits "intentionally
damag[ing] or caus[ing) the loss of any property (including animals or records) used
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fused the term with a rhetorical potency unknown merely four
years ago. The Model Act's drafters used the USA Patriot Act as a
platform, by borrowing its legal framework and specific enforce-
ment devices, but they also expanded its scope and severity to
reach non-violent activities that are not in any way related to ter-
rorism. In sum, while the USA Patriot Act clearly inspires and
informs the Model Act, the proponent industries' custom-crafted
versions of it are even more of a threat to civil liberties.
E. The Bill's Proponents
The Model Act was drafted by the American Legislative Ex-
change Council (ALEC), and was subsequently adopted and
pushed by the U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance, a "front group" for fire-
arms and ammunition manufacturers.5 9 ALEC is a tax-exempt,
Washington, D.C. based organization that brings together its
2,400 member state lawmakers in "task forces" to draft model leg-
islation from a right-wing perspective on a host of issues. 60 It re-
ceives over $5 million annually from its corporate members,
including tobacco companies, agribusiness trade associations, pri-
vate corrections facilities, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
even the National Rifle Association. 61 Once ALEC's task forces
complete a model law, its members introduce identical or similar
bills directly into their state legislatures. 62 ALEC retains its tax-
exempt status by reporting lobbying expenditures of zero, since its
"member" legislators introduce the bills themselves. 63 In essence,
ALEC is little more than a matchmaker between corporate inter-
ests who "pay to play," and right-wing legislators eager to do their
bidding, all cloaked under a "tax exempt facade."6 4 Although
ALEC's legislators are "members" in that they pay negligible dues
by the animal enterprise, or conspir[ing] to do so." Like the Model Act, the exact
nature of the property interest is not defined by the Bioterror Act. Nonetheless, the
Bioterror Act's proscription is much narrower, in that it does not reach activity that
merely "deters" enjoyment of the property interest, but limits only "intentional
damag[e]" to property.
59. See Tom Pelton, Hunters, Activists Have Many States In Cross Hairs: Md.
Animal-Rights Groups Join in National Fight, BALT. SUN, Oct. 24, 2004, at lB.
60. Michael Satchell, Humane Society of the United States, Legal Concerns:
ALEC Looks to Turn Animal Activists into Domestic Terrorists, at http://www.hsus.
org/ace/20465 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
61. See Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 30, at 20-25. The authors of the report
describe ALEC as a "corrosive, secretive, and highly influential power in state
capitals around the nation." Id. at 1.
62. See id. at 5.
63. See id. at 4; Satchell, supra note 60.
64. See Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 30, at 1, 7, 9.
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each year, they can expect handsome returns in the form of paid
trips to task force meetings in desirable destinations, among other
things, all financed by corporate contributions to ALEC.65 This
matchmaking structure, unmediated by third-party lobbyists, al-
lows corporate members to get around conflict of interest and lob-
bying disclosure laws, which are weak in many states.66
With corporate members like the National Pork Producers As-
sociation and ExxonMobil, 67 it is no surprise that ALEC would be
the font for model legislation criminalizing animal and environ-
mental protection activists. Despite this conspicuous connection
to industries that derive naked economic protectionism from the
bill, its proponents nonetheless offer the feeble pretext that the
bills are necessary to protect Americans from "eco-terrorism." 68
Puzzlingly, they argue that the USA Patriot Act, with its broad
expansion of law enforcement authority to combat and prevent vi-
olence, is inadequate "because the federal definition of terrorism
requires the death of or harm to people, an element not character-
istic of eco-terrorists." 69 Given that the non-violent crimes to
which the proponents point are already criminalized, as noted
above, it seems unlikely that the bills' proponents genuinely seek
to further the protection of public safety. Rather, the sponsor in-
dustries clearly recognize and seek to take advantage of the politi-
cal expediency of the current anti-terror fervor, in order to secure
lasting economic protectionism for themselves.
65. Id. at 5-6. In fiscal year 2000, lawmakers' dues amounted to less than 1 per-
cent of ALEC's annual revenue. Id. at 18.
66. Id. at 4. For a summary of applicable state lobbying and disclosure laws and
loopholes, see id. at Appendix.
67. Id. at 23, 25.
68. ALEC, supra note 6, at 15.
69. Indeed, neither the government itself, nor peddlers of the eco-terrorism rheto-
ric can offer concrete proof that the targeted movements have ever injured or killed
any Americans. A 1993 Department of Justice report surveying the activities of the
animal rights movement did not attribute to it any violence or deaths. In fact, it
stated, "none of the extremist animal rights-related activities analyzed for this report
is known to have resulted in the injury or death of another individual." U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON ANIMAL ENTERPRISES 16 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE]. To the contrary, the Animal Liberation Front Guidelines
require acts carried out in ALF's name "to take all necessary precautions against
harming any animal, human and nonhuman." See Animal Liberation Front, The
Credo / Guidelines of the Animal Liberation Front, at http://www.animalliberation-
front.us/ALFrontlalfcredo.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). See also TERRORISTS OR
FREEDOM FIGHTERS? REFLECTIONS ON THE LIBERATION OF ANiMALs 8 (Steven Best &
Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2004).
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II. THE MODEL ACT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
INFIRMITIES
Regardless of which term is used to describe the prohibited
interference - whether "obstruct" in the Model Act, "deter" in the
New York bill, or "disrupt" in the Oklahoma law - the indefinite
nature of the term gives the Model Act a broad sweep across con-
duct and speech acts of almost any character. The imprecision
with which these operative terms are employed, perhaps deliber-
ately, proves to be the Model Act's primary constitutional flaw. By
restricting both protected and unprotected speech acts in the same
sweep, the Model Act is vulnerable to invalidation on First
Amendment grounds. Not only is the Model Act impermissibly
content-based, as explained in this Part, it is also vague and over-
broad, and is not amenable to a curative construction. This Part
also argues that the recent invalidation of a similar state law in
Utah, 70 which was much less vague and overbroad, is predictive of
the fate of the Model Act.
A. The Model Act is a Content-Based Speech Regulation,
Without a Sufficiently Compelling State Interest
The legal standard by which a restraint on speech is analyzed
for its lawfulness depends on whether the restraint abridges
speech based on its content. A content-based restraint is pre-
sumptively invalid unless the regulated speech is "unprotected,"
such as libel, obscenity or incitement to violence, or unless the
government justifies it by advancing a "compelling" state interest
that is "narrowly drawn."71 If, on the other hand, the regulation is
content-neutral, and regulates speech activities instead by their
manner, timing, or location, courts adopt a more deferential "in-
termediate scrutiny" standard. 72 While legislatures retain the
right to regulate genuine breaches of the peace, such as the ob-
70. Domestic Terrorism of Commercial Enterprises, HB. 322, Gen. Sess. (Utah
2001) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-110, 76-10-2401 (2002)).
71. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 117-18 (1991).
72. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 159
(2002) (stating the rule). Under the intermediate scrutiny standard for content-neu-
tral constraints, regulation of speech is allowed "if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
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struction of a public sidewalk or street,73 the Model Act is not such
a "time, place, and manner" regulation.7 4 It does not differentiate
between protest acts that physically and fully obstruct ingress to
businesses, and those that "obstruct" businesses by persuading
consumers not to enter based on the content of their message.75
Indeed, the Model Act reaches activity that "deters" business even
if the action does not take place anywhere near the business
premises.76
Rather, the Model Act is unmistakably content-based. It does
not restrict speech that is favorable to the protected business en-
terprises, nor does it bar all speech on the subject. Only speech
that has a detrimental economic effect is punished. It goes with-
out saying that speech favorable to or made by the favored busi-
ness interests would not cause them economic harm. Generally,
the Court treats this type of "restriction of the expression of a par-
ticular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amend-
ment."77 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, for example, the Supreme
Court invalidated a local ordinance on the grounds of viewpoint
discrimination, finding that it forbade the hate speech of one
group but would not have addressed similar speech acts of com-
peting groups.78 A similar dynamic is at work in the Model Act.
As in the St. Paul ordinance, the two sides of the debate must play
by different rules. Nothing in the Model Act limits speech activi-
ties that similarly "deter" or "obstruct" the efforts of the protected
businesses' critics. This type of asymmetrical viewpoint-based re-
striction has not been tolerated by the Court.
Even if the Model Act could somehow be portrayed as content-
neutral, despite its overt favoritism toward certain viewpoints, its
use of the listener's subjective "fear" as a basis for regulation
would in and of itself render the Model Act content-based. As
noted above, the Model Act prohibits "[diepriving the owner of an
73. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).
74. An example of an acceptable "time, place, and manner" restriction is the
thirty-six foot "speech-free buffer zone" upheld against anti-abortion protesters by the
Supreme Court. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 768-71 (1994).
The Model Act, by contrast, has no physical proximity requirements, but is based
instead solely upon the economic effect of the targeted protest activity. See ALEC,
supra note 6, § 3(A).
75. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3.
76. Id.
77. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAw 193 (1st
ed. 1999) [hereinafter SULLIVA & GUNTHER].
78. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992).
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animal or natural resource . . .by way of ... fear. . . ."79 As
commentators have noted, constraints on speech "that is deemed
likely to cause a certain response in the audience based on its con-
tent are typically viewed skeptically as direct content restric-
tions."80 A similar response-driven standard was invalidated in
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement as a content-based re-
striction insufficiently justified by the city.81 There, the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that allowed officials to exact va-
riable parade permit fees based on the audience's response to the
speech.8 2 The county enacted the ordinance after a peaceful civil
rights march drew thousands of violent Ku Klux Klan counter-
demonstrators, which in turn required the city to expend addi-
tional resources on police.8 3 The ordinance would have required
subsequent parade organizers to pay additional fees if the parade
was pre-determined to arouse certain reactions in listeners - such
as fear - and hence require additional police presence.8 4 In strik-
ing down the ordinance, the court held that "[l]isteners' reaction to
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation."85 Like the
ordinance in Forsyth County, enforcement of the Model Act de-
pends on the listener's response or subjective state of mind, be-
cause the prohibition includes loss of business by way of "fear,"
among other things.8 6
Having established that the Model Act is content-based, the
inquiry now turns to the whether the interests advanced by the
government in support of the regulation are sufficiently compel-
ling. As a preliminary matter, we must ascertain what the gov-
ernment interest truly is. The Model Act's proponents assert that
79. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(1).
80. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 77, at 197. It is important to distinguish
between "fear" caused by the speech itself, and "fear" that derives from violent activi-
ties incited by the speech, or from threats communicated by the speech. The incite-
ment and extortion cases are inapposite here, because the Model Act, on its face,
criminalizes pure speech that any listener finds subjectively fearful, even in the ab-
sence of incitement or extortion. Again, the drafters chose not to limit the Model Act's
prohibitions to inciting or extortionate speech.
81. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-37 (1992).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 125-26.
84. See id. at 126-27.
85. Id. at 134 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
86. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(1). Although the listener's or victim's subjective
reaction is an element of certain crimes, such as lack of consent in sexual assault or
harassment cases, or certain defenses, such as self-defense, it is not tolerated in the
First Amendment context as a basis for constraining speech. See, e.g., Forsyth
County, 505 U.S. at 134-35.
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it is needed to protect Americans from "eco-terrorism. 's7 How-
ever, the following four reasons, some of which are explored in fur-
ther detail elsewhere in this Article, reveal the public safety
rationale to be a mere pretext.
First, the truly destructive and extortionate activity that is
prohibited by the Model Act is already criminalized.5 8 Second, the
proponents themselves, along with other anti-terrorism advocates
and even the government, admit that the targeted activists are
non-violent by definition.8 9 Third, if the Model Act were truly pre-
mised on public safety or threats to the populace as a whole, it
would read more like Indiana's agricultural terrorism statute, dis-
cussed supra in Part I, which addresses physical attacks on the
food supply with "weapons of mass destruction."90 Finally, the
Model Act's industry-specific character, which is even narrower
than the agricultural disparagement statutes discussed below,
does not benefit the entire agriculture sector, but only a small
group of certain types of businesses.
The public safety pretext having been stripped away, the
state's true interest is revealed to be naked economic protection-
ism for a limited class of beneficiaries. Strict scrutiny is "almost
always fatal,"91 but state interests premised solely on economic
motives are especially vulnerable. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware, discussed further in Part III, the Court held that even
broad-based economic fluctuations with the potential to wipe out
entire markets were not a sufficiently compelling state interest.92
In the drafters' report accompanying the Model Act, not even this
level of economic perturbation is alleged, as it was during passage
of the agricultural disparagement statutes.93 Of the few content-
based speech restraints to survive the Court's strict scrutiny anal-
ysis, the interests advanced by the respective states were discrete
87. ALEC, supra note 6, at 4.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. Although duplicity is not indicative
of pretext in and of itself, it serves to illustrate that the drafters were not, at best,
acting with singularity of purpose.
89. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 69; see also Matthew E. Dun-
ham, Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat In the United States: A Case Study
On the Eradication of the Red Brigades, 107 DICK. L. REV. 151, 169 (noting that direct
actions by the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front in the United
States "have not caused direct physical injury to people").
90. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-12-2 (Michie 2005).
91. SULLIVA & GUNTHER, supra note 77, at 196.
92. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982).
93. See ALEC, supra note 6, at 15.
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in nature and truly compelling, such as the right to vote.94 Com-
pared to the right to vote, economic favoritism hardly appears
compelling.
Nor can the restraint be justified on the unverified assump-
tion, inherent in the Model Act's focus on one particular type of
activism, as opposed to any anti-business activity, that debate as
to a particular subject matter is inherently "more prone to produce
violence."95 Rather, "[predictions about imminent disruption
from picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an indi-
vidualized basis, not by means of broad classifications."96 Here,
an individualized judgment would reveal exactly the opposite:
that the targeted movements are inherently and by definition non-
violent, and have in fact endured more violent attacks than they
have propagated.9 7 All in all, the state interest behind the Model
Act is no more than a pretext, and is thus insufficiently compelling
to justify its content-based restriction on speech, rendering its
constitutionality suspect.
B. The Model Act is Unconstitutionally Overbroad
A restraint on speech is overbroad, and hence unconstitu-
tional, if, as here, it reaches conduct or non-protected speech such
as fighting words, along with protected speech. In Gooding v. Wil-
son, for example, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an
anti-war protester under a state breach-of-peace law that forbade
the utterance of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending
to cause a breach of the peace."98 The Court struck the statute
down on its face, because it swept within its breadth both fighting
94. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
95. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972).
96. Id. at 101.
97. Examples of violence against activists abound, but none has ever been labeled
"terrorism." In 1985, for instance, Dian Fossey was murdered by the gorilla poachers
she worked against. See Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella, Behind the Mask: Uncov-
ering the Animal Liberation Front, in TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS? REFELEC-
TIONS ON THE LIBERATION OF ANIMALS 61 n.31 (Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella II
eds., 2004). The same year, French authorities killed a photographer who was docu-
menting whale hunts. See id. In 1988, activist Chico Mendes was allegedly assassi-
nated by cattle ranchers. See id. Logging companies have purposely felled trees
containing tree-sitters, including one incident that killed anti-logging activist David
Gypsy Chain. See id. In 1990, Judi Bari and Darryl Cherney were nearly killed by a
bomb that detonated their car following their high-profile anti-logging activism. See
id. By way of contrast, animal and environmental protection activists have not been
convicted of any violent or fatal attacks in the United States. See U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, supra note 69.
98. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972).
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words and otherwise lawful speech. "The separation of legitimate
from illegitimate speech," Justice Brennan admonished, "calls for
more sensitive tools than Georgia has supplied."99
Likewise, in Machesky v. Bizzell, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found a Mississippi state court's protest injunction uncon-
stitutionally overbroad because it "lumps the protected with the
unprotected in such a way as to abridge important public interests
in the full dissemination of public expression on public issues."100
The injunction invalidated in Machesky bears a remarkable re-
semblance to parts of the Model Act. It prohibited:
1. Picketing or marching, or persuading or inducing any other
person or persons to picket or march, in any organized form
whatsoever [in the vicinity of plaintiff business owners];
2. Loitering or congregating ... for the purpose of doing any-
thing whatsoever, directly or indirectly, to induce, persuade, or
coerce any person or persons not to trade or do other business
with the [complainants]; ...
6. Threatening, intimidating, coercing, or using force or violence
upon any person or persons so as to dissuade such person or
persons from entering or trading [with complainants]. 101
Note the use of similar operative terms such as "coerce," which is
paired here with "induce" and "persuade." Both the injunction
and the Model Act expressly forbid speech that is designed to dis-
suade patrons from transacting with certain business interests,
without differentiating between protected and non-protected
speech acts. Moreover, the injunction in Machesky was invali-
dated despite the fact that the targeted boycott and protest activi-
ties were intermingled with acts of violence, as in Claiborne
Hardware.102
The Model Act, like the Georgia statute in Gooding and the
injunction in Machesky, is not a sensitive instrument, but one of
unfathomable breadth and bluntness. For instance, the New York
bill prohibits the "supporting [of] any politically motivated activity
through intimidation, coercion, fear, or other means that is in-
tended to obstruct, impede or deter [the favored business activ-
ity] ."1O3 In this provision, the term "other means" functions as the
99. Id. at 528 (internal citations omitted).
100. Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969).
101. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
102. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
103. See ABCNY, supra note 34, at 2. (emphasis added).
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phrase "anything whatsoever" did in the Machesky ordinance. Its
very indefiniteness signals that speech acts will not be differenti-
ated based on their protected status.104 Forbidden acts could in-
clude anything from firebombing to a bake sale to raise funds for
the industries' political opponents. Even without the term "other
means," the Model Act is still stunningly overbroad, as the unde-
fined prohibitions on "deterring," "impeding," or "disrupting" busi-
ness could be construed to include both lawful protest activity and
unlawful extortion. 10 5
Broadening its scope further still, the Model Act also
criminalizes actors who donate money to or in any way assist the
targeted organizations, regardless of the donors' knowledge or in-
tent, so long as the organization "deter[s]" the protected business
activity. 10 6 In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Supreme Court
struck down a similar membership clause in the Subversive Activ-
ities Control Act (SACA) as unconstitutionally overbroad.10 7
There, as here, "the [regulation] is supported only by a tenuous
relationship between the bare fact of organizational membership
and the activity Congress sought to proscribe,"108 which is in turn
irreconcilably vague.
In striking down the membership clause of SACA, the
Aptheker Court held that without a specific intent requirement,
the Act "sweeps within its prohibition both knowing and unknow-
ing members," 10 9 thereby impermissibly "invad[ing] the area of
protected freedoms." 110 The Model Act similarly fails to distin-
guish between active members and passive donors. In sum, the
Model Act is overbroad not only in its ill-defined operative terms,
but also in its indifferent treatment of an organization's constitu-
104. Even if the Model Act could be said to regulate only conduct, which, as ex-
plained above, would be an imaginative interpretation, its overbreadth is nonetheless
"substantial" enough to meet the standard necessary for a facial invalidation as set
forth in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973). Its limitless terms and
subjective, listener-defined standards also evade curative construction, as discussed
infra Part II.E.
105. See supra Part I.A.; See also ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(3).
106. See ALEC, supra note 6, §§ 2(D), 3(A)(3). Although the Model Act does not
use the word "membership," this provision should nonetheless be viewed as a mem-
bership clause, since almost every large special interest group now considers its do-
nors "members," regardless of their actual participation level.
107. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 510. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
110. Id. at 508.
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ency. Either flaw, on its own, renders the Model Act
unconstitutional.
C. The Model Act is Also Unconstitutionally Vague
A criminal statute such as the Model Act must provide citi-
zens with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can under-
stand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.""' This re-
quirement is premised on the procedural due process right to no-
tice. 112  Simply put, adequate notice of what activity is
criminalized allows the governed to know that enforcement de-
rives from a legitimate source of legislative authority, and is not in
fact pure fiat. In this sense, vagueness also implicates the non-
delegation doctrine: "[tihe failure to provide adequate standards
... reflects Congress' failure to have made a 'legislative judg-
ment."' 3 The need for such a legislative judgment is "especially
acute" when fundamental freedoms such as free speech are in-
volved."14 Without meaningful standards as to what conduct is
criminalized, the executive or enforcement authority thus be-
comes legislative in character, substituting its own standards as it
goes.
The Model Act and its state bills make just such an impermis-
sible delegation of discretion to law enforcement authorities, by
flatly prohibiting all conduct that has the effect of "deterring" the
commercial activity of the protected businesses. As this Article
has demonstrated, the acts leave operative terms like "deter" un-
defined. Any successful attempt to influence consumers not to
support controversial business practices has the effect of deterring
commerce, or at least re-routing it to other businesses. Conceiva-
bly, one law enforcement agent might view anything short of, or
perhaps even including, civil disobedience as not having a deter-
rent effect, while another would view wearing a certain button or
a t-shirt as a deterrent modality.
This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the Model
Act's prohibitions depend on the outcome or effect of the regulated
speech activity. For instance, the Model Act's criminal sanctions
111. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing, inter alia, Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982)).
112. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 77, at 332.
113. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-75 (1967) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)).
114. See id. at 277.
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vary based on the dollar amount by which the protected business
was affected, as measured after the fact. 115 The speaker cannot
know in advance whether her efforts to persuade consumers and
hence deter business will be successful, although she hopes they
will, and has a constitutionally protected right to try.116 Nor can
she guess whether she will ultimately persuade consumers to
withhold $500 as opposed to $501 worth of business on any given
occasion, thus triggering the felony provision. Accordingly, be-
cause persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application,"'1 7 the Model Act is
unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, when the regulation "in-
vokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental
rights ... the area of permissible indefiniteness narrows."11 8
Perhaps more troubling, the Model Act may even have the ef-
fect of delegating enforcement to the protected entities them-
selves, by regulating speech activities based on the listener's
subjective state of mind. As discussed earlier in this Part, liability
attaches under the Model Act if the protected business interest is
deterred by way of "fear." 1 9 Fear is a necessarily subjective
human response that varies greatly among people even when sub-
jected to the same stimulus. Since the complainant's fear becomes
an element of the offense, speakers potentially affected by the
Model Act have no way to determine how to conduct themselves,
or how they should alter the content of their speech so that sensi-
tive listeners will not find it fearful. Also unanswered is what the
listener must "fear" - since the Model Act prohibits speech that
negatively impacts the protected businesses' revenue, as ex-
plained above, it follows that speech is outlawed under the Model
Act when it causes the listener to "fear," among other things, even
a drop in sales.
In Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad a city ordinance,
115. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 4(A), (B). Also unspecified is the complainant's
burden of proof as to what she must show to prove economic harm. Without a clear
standard, simply saying she was harmed may make it so. Such a regime would, at
best, provide insufficient notice, and at worse, be susceptible to arbitrary and capri-
cious enforcement. In effect, it would convert public law enforcement officers into the
favored business entities' private security force.
116. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910-11.
117. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
118. Robel, 389 U.S. at 275 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(1).
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that, like the Model Act, was predicated on the listener's subjec-
tive response to the message. 120 The Court reasoned:
[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus,
the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible nor-
mative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all.121
Similarly, there is no real standard of conduct within the Model
Act. In sum, the Model Act is not only overbroad, but also imper-
missibly vague. It offers courts and law enforcement agents few
clues as to the outer boundaries of its scope, and affords poten-
tially affected speakers no notice as to whether the content of their
speech will subject them to incarceration.
D. A Preview: Utah's Short-Lived Commercial Terrorism
Statute
In Utah, the same alignment of business interests behind the
Model Act attempted to silence the speech of their political oppo-
nents using a slightly different technique, which was struck down
as unconstitutional before it even went into effect. In 2001, the
Utah legislature passed a "Domestic Terrorism of Commercial En-
terprises" bill by which an individual would be guilty of terrorism
if "he enters.., a building of any business with the intent to inter-
fere with the employees, customers, personnel, or operation of a
business." 122 Notably, the definition of "enter" included "the in-
trusion of any physical object, sound wave, light ray, electronic
signal or other means."123 Like the Model Act, the bill singled out
activity that intended to "interfere" with an "animal
enterprise."1 24
Before the law went into effect, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) of Utah filed an action for declaratory judgment
and a preliminary injunction on behalf of the Utah Animal Rights
Coalition, whose members feared they would be criminally prose-
120. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 616 (1971).
121. Id. at 614.
122. H.B. 322, § 4, 2001 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2001) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-
6-110, 76-10-2401 (2002)); See American Civil Liberties Union of Utah, Court Declares
Utah's "Commercial Terrorism" Statute Unconstitutional, at http://www.acluutah.org/
prl01001.htm (Oct. 10, 2001) [hereinafter ACLU of Utah].
123. H.B. 322, § 3; ACLU of Utah, supra note 122.
124. See H.B. 322, § 1.
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cuted for engaging in peaceful picketing activities. 125 The law
would have treated protesters as though they maintained a physi-
cal presence inside the business premises, and hence guilty of
criminal trespass and commercial terrorism, if their chants could
be heard inside the building, or if their signs could be seen from
inside the building.126 This metaphysical feat was accomplished
by treating a "light ray" or "sound wave" as the physical embodi-
ment of a person. Not even the strictest of abortion access laws
and injunctions upheld by the courts went so far. 27
The plaintiffs argued that the commercial terrorism statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed to distinguish
between harmful conduct and protected, expressive speech acts.
For example, as the plaintiffs noted:
[n]owhere do defendants explain why the definition [of light ray]
necessarily excludes expressive use of light, such as plaintiffs'
use of candles, nor do they offer any evidence to support their
assertion that the statute only targets potentially harmful uses
such as shining a bright light into the eye of a person or
animal. 128
The plaintiffs also argued that the law was vague in that a reason-
able person could not be certain what was meant by its prohibi-
tions on "light rays" and "sound waves."' 29
Moreover, based on their personal experiences with Utah law
enforcement officers, the plaintiffs feared that the law would yield
arbitrary or "more severe and overzealous" enforcement against
them as individuals. 30 The plaintiffs also argued that the regula-
125. See ACLU of Utah, supra note 122.
126. See id.
127. Note the similarities between the Utah "light ray" restriction and the "images
observable" provision of a Florida injunction against anti-abortion protesters that the
Supreme Court struck down in Madsen, 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994). The Madsen in-
junction, like the Utah statute, prohibited protesters from using signs and placards
that were observable inside the affected clinics. In striking down this provision, the
Madsen Court noted that if the clinic found the protesters' signs disturbing, all it had
to do was close the curtains or look away. Id. For a cogent summary and analysis of
Madsen and the seminal abortion protest cases, see Christopher P. Keleher, Double
Standards: The Suppression of Abortion Protesters' Free Speech Rights, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 825, 851-58 (2002).
128. Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 11,
Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. State of Utah (D. Utah 2001) (No. 2:01-CV-0221 J).
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 8 (citing affidavits regarding a police officer who kept a copy of the bill
on his person, and used it to threaten and intimidate activists into thinking it was
already the law).
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tion was not content-neutral, based on the defendants' admission
that the statute was targeted at speech "against fur farmers, trap-
pers... zoos, circuses, rodeos [and other animal enterprises]," but
would not prohibit speech in favor of these interests. 131 Finally,
the plaintiffs asserted that if they were forced to relocate out of
the sight and hearing of potential consumers, their otherwise law-
ful protest activity would lose all meaning.
The court sided unequivocally with the plaintiffs. U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Bruce Jenkins temporarily enjoined enforcement of
the law and later struck it down on its face as overbroad. 132 In its
preliminary injunction opposition brief, and at oral argument, the
State attempted unpersuasively to argue that the terms "light
ray" and "sound wave" were intended to prohibit only the offensive
use of light and sound, such as "ultra sonic sound waves, blaring
noises, and intrusive light rays," including the use of a laser
pointer.133 Judge Jenkins, noting that the statute did not so de-
limit the terms, then asked the state: "Can you speak without us-
ing a sound wave? Can you see without the use of a light ray?"' 34
Judge Jenkins rejected the argument that the Kovacs v.
Cooper line of noise regulation cases controlled. 135 Rather, he
found instead that the statute was content-based, and that the
"sound waves" and "light rays" prohibitions were void of any
meaningful standard.1 36 Nor would Judge Jenkins bestow a cura-
tive construction upon the otherwise facially overbroad statute, 137
because, as the plaintiffs argued, the resulting statute would be
little more than a repetition of existing criminal trespass laws,
and "it is not clear the Legislature would have passed [such a]
131. Id. at 16.
132. See Order at 2, Utah Animal Rights Coalition (Oct. 25, 2001) (No. 2:01-CV-
0221 J). Although the court did not rule on vagueness in its final order, the court
found, in the order granting the motion for a preliminary injunction, that the plain-
tiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of showing that the statute was both
overbroad and vague. See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 4, Utah Animal Rights Coalition (May 16, 2002) (No. 2:02-CV-0221 J).
133. See Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 6,
Utah Animal Rights Coalition (No. 2:01-CV-0221 J).
134. Associated Press, Federal Court Blocks Utah 'Commercial Terrorism' Law,
May 7, 2001, available at http://freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?document
ID=13881.
135. 336 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1949) (upholding ordinance prohibiting all "loud and rau-
cous noises").
136. See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Utah
Animal Rights Coalition (May 16, 2001) (No. 2:01-CV-0221 J).
137. Id.
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statute if its intent was ... to create an additional tool to combat
'eco-terrorism."1 38
A similar fate awaits the Model Act. At least the commercial
terrorism statute attempted to specify what is meant by "interfer-
ence" with a business interest, although terms like "sound wave"
ultimately generated more confusion than clarity. The Model Act
is vaguer still, leaving operative terms such as "deter" to the wide-
ranging interpretation of law enforcement officers, or worse yet, to
the complainants themselves. 139 It is also fatally overbroad, be-
cause, like the Utah statute, it criminalizes speech along with
other conduct that is already proscribed by the state's criminal
code. Accordingly, as with the Utah statute, "[i]t is not possible to
limit the [Model Act] to acts of 'eco-terrorism' alone, as the [state]
would have the Court believe." 140  "Annoyance at ideas," the Su-
preme Court warned almost sixty years ago, "can be cloaked in
annoyance at sound."141 A similar pretext is at work in the Utah
commercial terrorism statute and the Model Act - two attempts
by the same lobby, using a slightly different technique, to keep
consumers from hearing the message of their political opponents.
Perhaps most importantly, throughout the proceedings, the
plaintiffs stressed, and the court accepted, that the affected par-
ties' concerns are not hypothetical - "[n]ot wanting to be arrested,
plaintiffs would likely remain silent rather than risk arrest and/or
criminal charges."1 42 Certainly, criminalization is the most chil-
ling state action of all, short of brute force. Indeed, myriad evi-
dence of chilling mounted after passage of the agricultural
disparagement laws, even though the disparagement laws were
all civil constraints save one. 143 The chilling argument is equally
hard to overstate with respect to the Model Act.
138. Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Utah
Animal Rights Coalition (No. 2:01-CV-0221 J) (emphasis added). Further discussion
of why the Model Act is not worthy of curative construction follows infra Part II.E.
139. See supra text accompanying note 115.
140. Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20,
Utah Animal Rights Coalition (No. 2:01-CV-0221 J).
141. Saia v. People of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).
142. Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 6,
Utah Animal Rights Coalition (No. 2:01-CV-0221 J).
143. See infra Part III. For instance, the publisher of a food safety book cancelled
its printing after Monsanto threatened to sue it under the agricultural disparagement
laws. See Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food
Safety in the Era of Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
823, 857-58 (2001). Another publisher reported that she received calls from the Pet
Food Institute regarding a pending book about the use of dead companion animals in
pet food. The caller verbally threatened the publisher and also suggested that a legal
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E. The Model Act Cannot be Saved by a Curative
Construction
If the Utah statute was not amenable to a curative construc-
tion, the Model Act certainly will not be, as its flaws are greater in
both severity and number. Although a court "will often strain to
construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack,
it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the
purpose of a statute ... or judicially rewriting it."144 To rescue the
Model Act from constitutional invalidation would require nothing
less than a judicial re-write of nearly every provision, which the
court is neither expected nor allowed to do.
For instance, the Model Act's operative terms "coerce" and
"deter," as we have seen, proscribe both criminal activities and
protected speech acts. In the First Amendment context, the term
"coerce" cannot be given a limiting construction without replacing
it entirely, since, as a matter of law, coercion is a permissible by-
product of protected speech acts. 145 Moreover, if the court circum-
scribes the term "deter" to include only violent or destructive
actions, little will remain of the Model Act that cannot be found
elsewhere in the criminal code.
A similar flaw plagued Utah's "commercial terrorism" law,
which the court declined to cure. 146 The Utah plaintiffs argued,
and the court accepted, that a limiting construction would distill
the law down to existing criminal provisions. 47 There, as here,
such a limitation would, in turn, contravene the plain meaning of
the statute, since merely restating the law does nothing to confer
additional protection, which is the stated aim of the Model Act. If
the Model Act's drafters truly intended to reach only violent or
extortionate conduct, they could have used more precise terminol-
ogy. Indeed, they needed to look only to existing criminal laws to
find such text. In these circumstances, it is not the job of the court
to redraft a statute's operative terms in a manner that will limit
its effect - that task must be left to the legislature.
action under the disparagement law was imminent. See id. at 858. Ironically, under
the Model Act, the publishing of such material would be criminalized, but not the
trade association's menacing, extortionate behavior. In the context of food safety
messages, which the Model Act would also no doubt reach, chilled speech could even
have adverse public health consequences.
144. Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (citing Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)).
145. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926 (1982).
146. See discussion supra Part II.D.
147. Id.
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Another infirmity requiring judicial redrafting is the member-
ship or organizational liability clause, by which the donors or
members of any organization deemed to be a "terrorist" group, re-
gardless of their knowledge or specific intent, are penalized in the
same manner as those actually carrying out the prohibited activ-
ity. 148 As explained more fully in Part III.A.3, during the Red
Scare, the Supreme Court obliged Congress and gave a curative
construction to a similar membership clause, by reading a specific
intent requirement into an anti-Communist law. 149 Such an effort
would do little to rescue the Model Act, however, because the pred-
icate activity aided by the would-be donor - namely, the "de-
ter[ring]" of commerce - could be achieved by perfectly lawful
means.1 50 The government cannot forbid donors and members
from aiding lawful protest activity, whether they specifically in-
tend to help "deter" business or not.
All told, the First Amendment obstacles that lie in the path of
the Model Act are many, and they are massive. If the Model Act
somehow withstands First Amendment scrutiny, it will have the
effect of "elevat[ing] private economic interests to the status of
constitutional rights."151 Not only are its content-based restric-
tions insufficiently justified by a compelling state interest, it is
also impermissibly overbroad and vague. Most offensive, how-
ever, is the Model Act's complete inversion of the elevated status
afforded political speech and civic participation. The Model Act
removes political speech from the core of First Amendment protec-
tions and instead makes it nothing less than an element of the
offense,1 52 as though political motivation somehow renders the ac-
tivity more odious or criminal in nature. Indeed, to characterize
participation in the legislative process as terrorism is an act of
extremism unto itself.
148. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(3).
149. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961).
150. Compare this to the predicate activity of the anti-Communist laws, which was
the forcible overthrow of the federal government.
151. Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values In the
Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 960 (1982) [hereinafter Labor Picketing].
152. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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III. A DEPARTURE FROM HISTORICAL AND
DOCTRINAL PATTERNS: IGNORING THE
LESSONS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE,
SCHENCK, AND OPRAH WINFREY'S MAD
COWS
The Model Act and its progeny are the latest refrain in a
lengthy melodrama of historical constraints on lawful protest ac-
tivity, many of which suffered from similar constitutional defects
and were ultimately invalidated. Although certain speech acts, as
explained below, have been criminalized in the name of national
security, the Model Act represents the first attempt to criminalize
pure speech in support of private economic interests. This is a
profound and troubling departure from well-settled doctrine. Tra-
ditionally, criminal sanctions are reserved for speech activity only
when the very existence of the State is somehow threatened. Con-
duct adverse to private business interests has only been criminal-
ized when the conduct is violent, destructive, or extortionist in
nature.16 3 The Model Act blurs these two doctrines by affording
protection to private business entities that was previously justi-
fied only by the gravest of national emergencies. Additionally,
each time the Model Act borrows a legal standard from an individ-
ual historical constraint, it misappropriates it.
In arguing that the Model Act represents a true departure
from precedent, this Part establishes a three-part categorization
of historical speech restraints, based on: (1) the object of protec-
tion (either the State or private interests); (2) the nature of the
constrained activity (either speech or violence/extortion); and (3)
the type of sanction (either civil or criminal). Figure 1 displays
each constraint as categorized according to these variables. His-
torical speech restraints to be compared include: federal laws
against "subversive" wartime activity; the "tortious interference"
doctrine; pre-First Amendment jurisprudence injunctions against
153. Federal criminal law already penalizes property damage to animal enter-
prises where the actor travels in interstate commerce or uses the mail system. See 18
U.S.C. § 43 (2000); see also Bioterror Act supra note 58, § 336. Unlike the Model Act,
this federal law makes clear that its reach is limited to "physical disruption" resulting
from intentional property damage, rather than undefined economic disruption. See
id. (emphasis added). In 2001, Rep. George Nethercutt introduced a bill similar to the
Model Act that would have amended 18 U.S.C. § 43 to penalize not just actions result-
ing in property damage, but also actions that cause a "loss of profits." H.R. 2795,
107th Cong. § 2 (2001). Notably, the bill would also have authorized the death pen-
alty where the act resulted in bodily harm - not just death - to another person. See
id. § 3. It was not referred out of the House Subcommittee on Crime.
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labor picketing; Civil Rights-era restraints on political boycotts;
and state agricultural disparagement laws.
Figure 1.
Category Method of Object of Constrained Type of
Abridgement Protection Behavior Sanction
1 Federal and The State Speech / Criminal
state laws association
against
"subversive"
activity
2 Tortious Private Speech / Civil
interference economic association
doctrine; interests
injunctions
against labor
picketing
Injunctions Private Speech / Civil
against civil- economic association
rights era interests
political
boycotts
State Private Speech / Civil (except
agricultural economic association Colorado,
disparagement interests which has
statutes never been
invoked)
3 Model Act and Private Speech / Criminal
state bills economic association
interests
A. Criminal Prosecution of Speech
National Security
in the Name of
1. Subversive Advocacy Laws, 1798-1950
Efforts to insulate the American government from the effects
of subversive speech date to the nation's formative years. The Se-
dition Act of 1798 authorized the incarceration of anyone who con-
spired to publish any "scandalous and malicious writings against
the government of the United States, or either house of the Con-
gress of the United States, or the President of the United States,
with intent to defame.., or bring them.., into contempt or disre-
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pute."154 Given the fragility of the fledgling State, such extreme
measures, in retrospect, appear more forgivable than they would
after the nation had better established itself. Yet even then, the
Sedition Act had its detractors. The Jeffersonian Republicans de-
cried the Act as a malleable and vague instrument used for parti-
san purposes. 155
The Act expired in 1801 with little fanfare. After its passing,
the concept of using federal law to protect the state from the ad-
verse effects of speech lay predominantly idle for 116 years, de-
spite the intervention of both international and civil wars. 156 The
Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918 were similar in character to the
Sedition Act of 1798, but focused on the nation's vulnerability dur-
154. The Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, § 2, 1 Stat. 596-97 (expired 1801).
155. The Jeffersonians' critiques were not merely academic; they and their news-
papers were frequent enforcement targets of the reigning Federalists. Such enforce-
ment abuses made the Act a "major factor" in the Jeffersonians' defeat of the
Federalists in the 1800 presidential election. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 77, at
5 (citing Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reap-
praisal, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 109).
156. Although most scholars habitually accept Zechariah Chafee's influential con-
clusion that the dawn of First Amendment jurisprudence arrived with Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), see Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War
Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919), other scholars point out that the vibrant struggle
over free speech in fact began prior to Schenk in state courts. See, e.g., David M.
Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 543 (1981)
(describing efforts to suppress abolitionist literature); Alexis J. Anderson, The Forma-
tive Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 64
(1980) (recounting municipal exercises of police power as they affected the right to
peaceably assemble).
The pre-Schenck cases, which were not litigated under the First Amendment,
wrestled instead with the limits of municipal police power in the context of peaceable,
yet sometimes disorderly, assembly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 19 N.E.
224, 226 (Mass. 1889) (affirming police power to license parades); In re Flaherty, 38 P.
981, 983 (Cal. 1895) (rejecting habeas corpus petition following nuisance conviction
for beating drum on public land in a daily ritual), cited in Anderson, supra, at 67-69.
In practice, what was deemed disorderly often depended on the political views held by
the assemblers. See Anderson, supra, at 71-72 (citing Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 49 S.E.
793, 794-95 (Ga. 1905) (deeming Socialist gathering to be a threat to public order);
State v. Sugarman, 148 N.W. 466 (Minn. 1914)).
The issue of incitement to violence, to which the First Amendment doctrine would
ultimately return, was first fully explored in the convictions of those thought to have
catalyzed the Haymarket Riots. See id. (citing Spies v. People, 12 N.E. 865 (Ill.
1887)). Because very few if any of these cases involved what we would now recognize
as pure speech acts fully protected by the First Amendment, they are not within the
scope of this Article, which focuses on the Model Act's implications for peaceful speech
and protest activities. As Anderson explains, "the mixture of conduct with pure
speech had fatally tainted [these] First Amendment claims." Id. at 73. Many of the
municipal ordinances at issue would be analyzed today under the deferential stan-
dard of review applied to time, place, and manner restrictions upon speech and public
assembly.
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ing times of war. The first of the Acts was made law on June 15,
1917, just two months after the United States declared war on
Germany. It addressed activities traditionally recognized as espi-
onage, such as stealing or copying defense blueprints, and making
false reports designed to interfere with military operations. 157
The reach of the first Espionage Act was broadened substan-
tially by the second Espionage Act, which amended Section 3 of
the first Act. Whereas the first Espionage Act prohibited attempts
to cause insubordination in the military by conveying false reports
or false statements, the second expanded these prohibitions to in-
clude the utterance, printing, or publishing of "any disloyal, pro-
fane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of
government of the United States, or the Constitution . . .or the
military.., or the flag.., or the uniform of the Army or Navy." 158
The second Espionage Act also protected certain commerce activi-
ties from "curtailment," but the protections were limited to the
production of "things .... necessary or essential to the prosecution
of the war,"1 59 such as munitions.
Prosecutors tried hundreds of people under the Espionage
Act, mostly Socialists or Communists who protested, in various
ways, America's entry into World War I. The well-known trilogy
of Supreme Court cases 60 that first interpreted the Espionage Act
began to fashion a central First Amendment principle: in order to
justify criminal restraints on pure speech, the speech must di-
rectly incite violence or pose a threat to the very existence of the
State.
In Schenck v. United States, for instance, the Court held that
regulation of speech activity is appropriate where the speech "cre-
ate [s] a clear and present danger that [it] will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."1 61 In the
context of war, the "substantive evils" referred to by Justice
Holmes, although not specified in the opinion, undoubtedly refer
to what we would now call threats to national security. Similarly,
the Court in Abrams v. United States viewed the defendant's pam-
phleteering as a threat to national security because the pamphlets
attempted to, in the eyes of the Court, "brin[g] upon the country
157. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
158. Espionage Act of May 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553-554.
159. Id.
160. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 620-21 (1919).
161. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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the paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the production
of all munitions and other things essential to the conduct of the
war."162 Dissenting in Abrams, Justice Holmes clarified what he
had meant by the "clear and present danger" standard and said
that the majority had misapplied it in affirming the defendant's
conviction. Rather, he suggested, speech must be tolerated unless
it "so imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check
is required to save the country."1 63 Each of these pronouncements
clearly ratifies the central principle by denoting the State, and its
very existence, as the object of protection.
Nonetheless, the Court went on to affirm the conviction of
each of the trilogy defendants anyway, even where his threat to
the nation-state could be described as attenuated at best.' 64 The
Court accomplished this not by compromising on the principle, but
by overstating the potency of the speech, and even at times dis-
torting the speech itself. In Abrams, for instance, the defendant's
pamphlet described the capitalist American government as the
"enemy" of workers - a phrase which the Court interpreted as, or
transubstantiated into, an unmediated exhortation to "put down
by force the government of the United States."165 By interpreting
the Espionage Acts broadly, the Court appears not to have been
insulated from the nation's paranoia of Socialist upheaval. As
Justice Holmes described the contagion of Socialism, even "a little
breath would be enough to kindle a flame."' 66
This anti-radicalism fervor also penetrated state govern-
ments, many of which passed similar "criminal anarchy" or "crimi-
nal syndicalism" laws that penalized the advocacy of overthrowing
organized government by force or violence. These laws withstood
First Amendment challenges on the theory that freedom of speech
"does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of self
preservation." 67 As with the Espionage Acts, the purported ob-
ject of protection was the State itself. The criminal anarchy laws,
however, encompassed a narrower range of speech activities, at
least in theory. Critiques of a mere "scurrilous" nature, prohibited
by the Espionage Act, would not fall within the criminal anarchy
162. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 622.
163. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 624.
165. Id. at 620.
166. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919).
167. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
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laws, which penalized only language advocating the use of force or
violence.
Nonetheless, Justices Holmes and Brandeis observed that the
state laws were being applied in a fashion that confused advocacy
with incitement. 168 The two Justices gradually distanced them-
selves from the majority in the criminal syndicalism cases, urging
that the clear and present danger standard authored by Justice
Holmes in Schenck had been dangerously weakened. 169 They
would have reinvigorated the standard to be more speech-protec-
tive: "[i]n order to support a finding of clear and present danger it
must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be
expected or was advocated."170 The two Justices appeared willing
to replace the "clear and present danger" standard entirely with a
new trio of terms: "immediate serious violence." The dissenting
Justices reiterated the principle that "the fact that speech is likely
to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the State."1 71
Gradually, the majority began to accept the Holmes/Brandeis
view. In the late 1920s, the Court retreated from its position in
the Schenck line of cases, overturning criminal advocacy convic-
tions on the bases that the predicate speech acts did not in fact
comprise incitement or pose a threat to the state.1 72 Soon thereaf-
ter, however, the Red Scare paranoia was revived, and federal
criminal anarchy laws resurfaced in the form of the Smith Act of
1940.173 Again, the object of protection was the existence of the
State, and the proscribed activity was the advocacy of overthrow-
ing the government by force or violence. Recognizing the similar-
ity of the Smith Act to the state laws that had come before it in the
Gitlow line of cases, the Court applied, or purported to apply, the
168. See e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927), overruled by Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). Justice Brandeis, concurring, noted that
"even advocacy of violation [of the law], however reprehensible morally, is not a justi-
fication for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement."
169. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
170. See Whitney, 274 U.S. 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 378.
172. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386 (1927); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242, 263-64 (1937).
173. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). The official title of the
Smith Act was the Alien Registration Act. Professors Sullivan and Gunther note that
the Smith Act was strikingly similar to the criminal anarchy law at issue in Gitlow,
268 U.S. 652. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 77, at 40.
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"clear and present danger" test in affirming the petitioners' con-
victions in Dennis v. United States.174 In Dennis, the Court also
upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act, although later cases
limited its reach by reading into it a specific intent
requirement.175
In each of the Smith Act convictions upheld by the Court, the
majority found the defendants' efforts to be an attempt to forcibly
overthrow the government, regardless of the negligible probability
of success in each. 176 Other federal subversive advocacy laws of
the time, such as the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
also focused on the threat of certain speech acts to the integrity of
the State.177 However, as the Court later made clear in Branden-
burg v. Ohio, legislative presumptions that entire categories of
speech acts comprise "an intolerable risk of serious harm" to the
state are impermissible. 17s In sum, whether or not courts applied
it correctly, the yardstick in each of the subversive advocacy laws
was national security, if not the very edifice of democracy, and
broad-based categorizations based largely on political viewpoint
were disfavored.
2. Comparison to the Model Act
Like the subversive advocacy laws, the Model Act creates a
legislative presumption that certain speech acts comprise "an in-
tolerable risk of serious harm."179 However, the "serious harm"
sought to be prevented by the Model Act is not harm to the State,
174. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951). Justices Black and
Douglas dissented, arguing that the majority had not in fact applied the clear and
present danger test, but made a mockery of it, as the facts did not support a finding
that the defendants' speech acts presented a danger to the State. See id. at 580-83.
They cautioned that the Smith Act should reach the teaching of terror tactics, but not
the teaching of doctrine. Id.
175. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516; Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220-21
(1961).
176. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509; Scales, 367 U.S. at 251.
177. International Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1988)), repealed by Friendship Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-199, 107 Stat. 2317, Title VIII, § 803(1) (1993). Section 4, for instance, forbade
the giving or receiving of information "affecting the security of the United States."
178. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S 444, 447-48 (1969); see also SULLIVAN & GUN-
THER, supra note 77, at 55.
179. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 77, at 38. However, as a panel of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed, "'[e]ven the [Smith Act] cases manifestly
stop short of allowing the kind of presumption,"' embodied here in Section 3(B) of the
Model Act, that membership implies misconduct, or that the law may make "a pre-
sumption of misconduct from mere status." See Taylor Flynn, Of Communism, Trea-
son, and Addiction: An Evaluation of Novel Challenges to the Military's Anti-Gay
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nor to any level of organized government, but to the economic in-
terests of one set of favored industries. Nowhere in the Model
Act's text or preamble do its drafters explain how the protection of
their enterprises from protest or criticism is necessary for the pro-
motion of national security, or that the Model Act is limited to
speech acts that incite imminent violence. By contrast, Section 3
of the Espionage Act prohibited disruption of certain manufactur-
ing activities, but only in relation to the production of war
materials. 180
Despite the important difference in their respective objects of
protection, the Model Act and the subversive speech laws impose
similar, severe criminal penalties. New York Senate Bill 2996, for
example, provides criminal penalties up to a ten thousand dollar
fine and a five year jail term for each violation.18 1 Similarly, the
Espionage Act of 1918 provided for a ten thousand dollar fine and
twenty year prison sentence.18 2 To place economic disadvantage
to certain business interests on a par with threats to the very exis-
tence of the State in this manner is to grossly distort what Judge
Learned Hand termed the "gravity of the evil"183 at issue.
Another key difference is that speech acts prohibited by the
Model Act need not advocate the use of force or violence, but
merely have the intent to "deter" the business activity in question.
Attempting to close an industry or to change its practices by influ-
encing its consumers or the government, without advocacy of vio-
lence, is little more than an ideal. Entire industries come and go
all the time as a result of socio-political change.184 The market-
place, it has been said, "is a hazardous place for the faint of heart;
this is part of the push and sell of a free market economy." 1 5 Not
all injury to economic interests should be punishable or even com-
Policy, 80 IOWA L. REV. 979, 1013-14 (1995) (quoting Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67
(D.C. Cir. 1993)).
180. The Espionage Act of May 16, 1918, Pub. Law No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553-54.
Recall also Indiana's agricultural terrorism statute, discussed supra in the text ac-
companying note 44, which makes an explicit and more cogent connection between
agricultural enterprise and national security, by treating agricultural infrastructures
as the medium for terroristic threats of a truly violent and population-wide nature.
See IND. CODE § 35-47-12-2.
181. S. 2996, 226th Ann. Legis. Sess. § 6 (N.Y. 2003).
182. The Espionage Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553-54.
183. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
184. The recently enacted Do Not Call registry, for example, which allows consum-
ers to forbid contacts by telemarketers, nearly put the whole telemarketing industry
out of business.
185. Jones, supra note 143, at 847.
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pensable. Some fluctuation is the result of exposure to the mar-
ketplace of competing ideas. Regardless, none of the activity
prohibited by the Model Act comes close to posing a threat to na-
tional security.
3. The Membership Clause of the Model Act
Some of the subversive advocacy laws and the cases interpret-
ing them also drew a distinction between those who actively deliv-
ered the allegedly inciting message, and those who passively
maintained membership in affiliated organizations.'1 6 This ac-
tive/passive membership distinction is not observed by the Model
Act, which criminalizes membership activities both active and
passive in nature, including the provision of "financial support or
other resources."18 7 Its drafters make no attempt to delineate be-
tween members who engage in already-criminalized activity,
members who engage in protected speech, and members who sim-
ply give donations, as explained in Part II. Similarly, two sections
of the Subversive Activities Control Act, in which Communist
Party membership was an element, "swe[pt] indiscriminately
across all types of association . .. without regard to the quality
and degree of membership.' 8 8 Although knowingly providing fi-
nancial support to efforts to overthrow the state can be criminal-
ized, the Supreme Court nonetheless invalidated both sections as
facially unconstitutional because of their overbreadth.'l 9 The
same flaw ails the Model Act's membership clause.' 90
More importantly, the membership clause of the Model Act
lacks a specific intent requirement such as that read into the
Smith Act by the Court in Scales v. United States in order to save
it from invalidation on First Amendment grounds. 19 ' The Smith
186. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221 (1961); United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967) (upholding facial overbreadth challenge to a provi-
sion of the Subversive Activities Control Act that barred Communist Party members
from employment with a defense contractor); see also Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514 (up-
holding facial overbreadth challenge to a provision of the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act that forbade Communist Party members from applying for passports). In
Robel and Aptheker, the Court invalidated, respectively, sections 5(a)(1)(D) and 6 of
the Subversive Activities Control Act. Robel, 389 U.S. at 281-282; Aptheker, 378 U.S.
at 517.
187. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(3).
188. Robel, 389 U.S. at 262.
189. See id.; see also Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514.
190. Regarding the Model Act's vagueness and overbreadth, see infra Parts II.B
and II.C.
191. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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Act made it a felony to knowingly become a member of any organi-
zation that advocates the forcible overthrow of the government. 192
Although the Smith Act contained no specific intent language, the
Court nonetheless upheld the defendant's conviction, finding that
he "specifically intend[ed] to accomplish [the organization's goals
to overthrow the government] by resort to violence."'193
Without such a saving construction, 194 if a mainstream organiza-
tion such as the Humane Society of the United States was deemed
a terrorist organization by virtue of its attempts to "deter" people
from patronizing certain businesses, all eight million of its donors
would also be subject to prosecution, regardless of whether they
intended to support or even knew about such activity.
Adding insult to injury, the criminal penalties that await the
donors of law-abiding organizations that do not advocate illegal
actions are identical to those that await the members of other
groups that advocate the commission of acts that are already
criminalized, such as property damage. Without resorting to hy-
perbole or acrobatic feats of construction, one can say that the
Model Act puts humane society donors on a par with arsonists. 195
As with the sections of the Subversive Activities Control Act that
were declared unconstitutional, the means chosen by the Model
Act to affect its purpose "cut deeply into the right of associa-
192. See Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
193. Scales, 367 U.S. 229, 254-55 (emphasis added) (quoting Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)).
194. For further discussion of the considerable judicial effort necessary to give the
Model Act a saving construction, see supra Part II.E.
195. This parallelism is not incidental, given the protected industries' economic
and ideological opposition to even the most altruistic aims of the humane movement.
For instance, one organization that supports the Model Act, the National Animal In-
terest Alliance Trust, even opposes the tax-exempt status of animal shelters. See Na-
tional Animal Interest Alliance Trust, NAIA Calls on President Bush to Act Against
Animal Extremists, http://www.naiatrust.org/support-petition.htm (last visited Sept.
12, 2005). One technique by which these trade associations have begun to actively
challenge the tax-exempt status of humane organizations is to slander them as ter-
rorists by way of attenuated connection to PETA and similar groups that condone
boycotts and other "economic terrorism." See id.; see infra note 315. In the views of
this organization, as related to the author by one of its trustees, since PETA happens
to also support spay and neuter programs, anyone else who supports spay and neuter
programs is therefore guilty by association of "economic terrorism." See id. Their
target is not just PETA, but the broader animal shelter movement, which detracts
from the ability of dog breeders and puppy mills to maximize revenue. The Model Act
serves the aims of such trade groups by negating the legal distinction between law
abiding and non-law abiding animal protection advocates.
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tion."196 Legal consequences aside, this overinclusive definition
also has significant rhetorical import. The mere suggestion that
environmental and animal protection is desirable thus becomes an
emblem of terrorism, and, by association to the subversive advo-
cacy laws, 197 perhaps even sedition. In short, the Model Act em-
bodies the most fearful elements of the subversive advocacy
doctrine, but without advancing the imminent national security
interests that justified those laws at the time.
B. Civil Constraints on Speech in the Name of Private
Business Interests
Unlike the subversive advocacy doctrine, pure speech has al-
most never been criminalized solely for the protection of private
business interests. 198 Speech acts have, however, been subject to
many civil constraints, ranging from damage awards in tort for
inducing a party to break its contract, to federal labor laws prohib-
iting so-called "secondary" boycotts, to injunctions barring protest
activity, to state statutes that lower the burdens of proof and per-
suasion in certain defamation actions. Like the criminal con-
straints, the civil constraints also date to the nineteenth century,
and their interpretation by the courts was varied and unpredict-
196. See Robel v. United States, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967). The Robel Court recog-
nized that the Subversive Activities Control Act criminalized certain actions, such as
espionage, that were already criminalized under federal law. As discussed, the Model
Act does the same. Id. at 268 n.18.
197. This Article suggests that the Model Act's invocation of the subversive advo-
cacy laws, deliberate or otherwise, is established not only by the borrowing of common
themes and text, but by the very notion that non-violent speech activities should be
subject to criminalization.
198. The sole exception to this pattern, as explained below, is Colorado's agricul-
tural disparagement statute, which provides criminal penalties for "knowingly ...
mak[ing] any materially false statement" about an agricultural product. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 35-31-101 (2004). It has never been applied. See supra note 9. In the
nineteenth century, labor and civil rights activists who violated injunctions were met
with criminal sanctions, but in each case the initial restraint was civil in nature. At
that time, there were also attempts to criminalize labor organizing under various the-
ories of conspiracy, but most dealt with speech activity that was of (or at least deemed
to be of) extortionate character. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Com-
monwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 119-20 (1842), however, drew the line,
expressly permitting labor organizing activities that did not involve extortion or oth-
erwise unlawful methods. In other jurisdictions, whether or not these early labor
cases involved conduct that was truly intimidating or extortionate is another matter.
See, e.g., Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 77 N.E. 176 (Ill. 1906) (prohibiting picketing
per se as intimidating and physically threatening). Either way, speech acts involving
extortion or physical threats, which would not today be recognized as fully protected
by the First Amendment, are significant historical events, but nonetheless beyond the
scope of this Article, as explained supra note 18.
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able. The Model Act leans heavily on these doctrines by implica-
tion to show that speech acts can be made subordinate to business
interests in certain contexts. However, as this Part argues, the
Model Act is little more than an attempt to get around the First
Amendment problems that plagued several of these approaches,
by using the trope of terrorism to cast a false urgency.
1. The Tortious Interference Doctrine
Prior to the 1850s, if a party to a contract was induced by
another to breach the contract, as in an employment dispute, the
other party could only obtain redress against the first party in
contract. 199 Thereafter, when "contract theory developed into an
abstract doctrine of property," contractual obligations came to be
treated as vested property rights. 200 Thus, courts began to recog-
nize "interference by a third party with the performance of a con-
tract . . . as an interference with property rather than as an
attempt to prevent the performance of an obligation."20 1 Most
scholars recognize Lumley u. Gye202 as the first case to develop the
new tort action of contractual interference. 20 3 In Lumley, the
plaintiff theater operator sued his rival theater for inducing a
well-known opera singer to breach her contract with the plaintiff
and perform for him instead. 20 4 In addition to the operator's
breach of contract claim against the singer, the Court also enter-
tained and upheld a cause of action against the rival theater oper-
ator in tort, as interference with the property rights that vested in
the contract.20 5 As the doctrine evolved, however, its application
was limited largely to the employer-employee relationship, rather
than the activities of business rivals, which were treated instead
as lawful competition. 20 6
199. See Note, Tortious Interference With Contractual Relations In the Nineteenth
Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510,
1511 (1980).
200. Id. at 1512.
201. Id. at 1513. This cause of action should not be confused with non-performance
of contract obligations caused by a third party's fraud, defamation, or extortion, which
were actionable in their own right prior to the arrival of the tortious interference
doctrine.
202. Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
203. See Note, supra note 199, at 1510, 1522.
204. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. 749.
205. Id.
206. See Note, supra note 199, at 1530-31 (citing Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGre-
gor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 614 (1889)).
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The Model Act borrows from the tortious interference doctrine
in that it exposes the third party inducer to liability if the in-
ducer's actions amount to a "deterrence" or "obstruction," as ex-
plained supra in Part I. However, the financial relationship
addressed by the Model Act, such as that between the protected
business interest and a dissuaded consumer, is not likely to be
contractual. The consumer who is persuaded to adopt dogs from a
shelter rather than buy dogs raised in inhumane puppy mills, for
instance, has not broken a contractual relationship, but merely
disappointed the producer's hope for additional profit. Nonethe-
less, when viewed in the context of the tortious interference doc-
trine, the Model Act proceeds to hold the third party inducer liable
as though the relationship between the consumer and the puppy
mill were contractual. Nothing in the Model Act supposes a limit
to this inferential chain. Rather, open-ended terms such as "other
means"20 7 suggest more of a dragnet approach to liability.
Perhaps more profoundly, just as the tortious interference
doctrine buttressed the then-newly minted theory that contrac-
tual promises were property rights, so the Model Act suggests that
businesses enjoy a vested property right to be free from any criti-
cism that has a deterrent effect. Conferring such a property inter-
est would not only radically expand the notion of property rights,
it may even have anticompetitive effects. 208 As one commentator
observed of the tortious interference cases,
the means of enticement .. .employed - persuasion - was not
inherently harmful. Unlike fraud or slander, not all persuasion
injures. The theory of contractual property enabled the judges
to determine that the persuasion in this instance was wrongful
merely because the plaintiff lost his contractual expectations. 20 9
Here, the Model Act protects not contractual expectations but
merely the favored industries' own hopes for success, free from the
effects of dissenters' persuasion of potential consumers. This is a
gross affront to the marketplace of ideas, not to mention competi-
tion in the actual market of goods.210
207. See A. 4884 / S. 2996, 226th Ann. Legis. Sess. § 1(J) (N.Y. 2003), and discus-
sion supra text accompanying note 103.
208. In the tortious interference cases, for example, the "'right' of competition" be-
came an affirmative defense. See Note, supra note 199, at 1532.
209. Id. at 1526 (emphasis added).
210. Some of the business interests behind the Model Act have already displayed
such anticompetitive proclivities, as illustrated by a lawsuit brought by Monsanto
against a Maine dairy producer in 2003 alleging "interference with advantageous bus-
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In sum, the Model Act harkens to, but perverts, the tortious
interference doctrine. By restraining efforts to persuade consum-
ers into changing their purchasing behavior, the Model Act ex-
pands the reach of the tortious interference concept to non-
contractual relationships. This would do nothing short of vesting
the protected business interests with a right to prevent adverse or
critical messages from reaching would-be consumers. Such a
profound threat to consumer autonomy and the natural flow of in-
formation in the marketplace should not be taken lightly.
2. Restraints on Labor Picketing
The tortious interference doctrine was not the only approach
used by business interests in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries to obtain relief from competitors or organized labor
who tried to induce third parties not to transact with those busi-
nesses. By the 1890's, businesses sought not contractual, but in-
junctive relief from such inducement activities. This was
especially the case where the third party was induced to break a
contract or withhold business by large groups of organized labor
picketers, rather than simply individual actors, as was the case in
most of the tortious interference cases. Accordingly, courts began
to analyze these cases not under the tortious interference doc-
trine, but under the common law as acts of coercion and intimida-
tion,211 at least until Congress drafted federal laws to uniformly
address labor relations. 212 Despite Congressional intervention,
iness relationships." See Complaint for an Injunction at 8, Monsanto Co. v. Oakhurst
Dairy, Inc. (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 03-11273 RCL). Monsanto alleged that the dairy's
use of the phrase "No Artificial Growth Hormones" on its packaging was an unfair
business practice because it implied that Monsanto's growth hormone products were
comparably unsafe. See id. at 5. The parties eventually settled the case when
Oakhurst agreed to remove the phrase from its packaging. See Clarke Canfield,
Oakhurst, Monsanto Resolve Lawsuit Over Milk Labeling, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 24,
2003. The Model Act essentially codifies the common law causes of action relied upon
by Monsanto with respect to speech acts that criticize the animal welfare or environ-
mental effects of business practices. Indeed, the Model Act would have applied di-
rectly to the Monsanto controversy, as Oakhurst also represented to customers that it
is more humane not to inject cows with growth hormone, see Complaint at 8-9, which
often causes mastitis and other painful ailments.
211. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1078 (Mass. 1896) (upholding an in-
junction against a two-person labor picket on the grounds that other employees were
subjected to threats of personal injury); cf Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.)
111, 119-20 (1842) (permitting picketing where extortion and threats not used).
212. See, e.g., Federal Anti-Injunction Act of Mar. 23, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47
Stat. 70; Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935); Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 101
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states and municipalities continued to regulate labor protest and
picketing activity using their police powers.
In the post-Schenck era, such regulations were assessed for
their congruence with picketers' First Amendment rights. By
1937, the Court had confirmed that businesses no longer enjoyed
an unfettered right of "free enterprise" against interference, as
they had during the tortious interference era.213 Against this
backdrop, the Court held in Thornhill v. Alabama that peaceful
picketing was entitled to First Amendment protection even where
the presence of protesters harmed the economic interests of the
picketed business.214
However, the Supreme Court soon excluded from the reach of
Thornhill any picketing having an "illegal objective." 215 For ex-
ample, the Court found picketing to have an "illegal objective,"
and hence not fall within the protections of the First Amendment,
where the targeted entity was induced by picketers to break a
state law, such as an antitrust law.216 Over time, however, "ille-
gal objectives" also came to include actions that were merely con-
sidered bad "policy," such as inducing a business to adopt non-
discrimination hiring policies. 217 The uneven application of the
"illegal objective" standard recalls a similar phenomenon in the
subversive advocacy cases, where courts often construed as a
"clear and present danger" speech activity that most observers
would now recognize as harmless.
As it did with the subversive advocacy cases, the Model Act
misapplies the legal standard at issue in the "illegal objective"
picketing cases. The Model Act's prohibition on activity that "de-
ter[s]" a protected business activity recalls the picketing cases be-
cause picketing is one method by which activists could attempt to
deter business. However, unlike the labor picketing cases, the
et seq.). The laws are known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, and the Labor Management Relations Act respectively.
213. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Senn v. Tile Layers Protec-
tive Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
214. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940) (striking down state anti-pick-
eting law as unconstitutionally overbroad).
215. Labor Picketing, supra note 151, at 942.
216. See id. at 942 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 500-
01 (1949) (affirming injunction against picketers where acceding to picketer's de-
mands would force business to break state antitrust laws).
217. Id. at 942-43 (citing Hughes v. Super. Ct., 339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950) (upholding
injunction against picketing of business that refused to hire African-Americans, on
the grounds that urging the plaintiff to hire on the basis of race would "subvert" the
state's "policy" of race-blind hiring)).
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Model Act makes no attempt to distinguish between protest activ-
ity that is motivated by an "illegal objective," whereby the
targeted business would be induced to break the law,218 and that
which involves no law-breaking on the part of either the picketer,
the business, or the would-be consumer. Rather, the only motive
the Model Act concerns itself with is whether the action is "politi-
cally motivated,"219 which is included as an element of the crime,
as though a certain ideology or belief system somehow makes the
action more criminal. Ironically, the activists at whom the Model
Act is targeted often attempt to persuade business interests to
comply with the law, not break it.220
3. Civil Rights Era Boycott Injunctions
Some scholars draw a line between labor activity and so-
called "political" boycotts, whose purpose is not to leverage eco-
nomic power with regard to an employment arrangement, but for
the benefit of some other political cause not directly related to the
parties' relationship.221 As with the tortious interference doctrine
and the "illegal objective" standard from the labor picketing cases,
the Model Act also misappropriates or violates the legal standard
set forth in the political boycott cases, by criminalizing peaceful
speech acts alongside violent or destructive actions.
As a preliminary matter, it can be shown that the Model Act
functions as an anti-boycott law as well as an anti-picketing law.
The civil damages provision of the Model Act provides that:
[a] person who has been damaged by a violation of the . .. Act
may bring against the person who caused the damage an action
... to recover (1) an amount equal to three times all economic
218. This is not to be confused with the Model Act's provisions pertaining to con-
duct that is already criminalized in its own right, as explained supra in the text ac-
companying note 27.
219. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 2(N). As explained supra in the text accompanying
note 16, the "politically motivated" activities forbidden by the Model Act include not
only classic political speech acts, which are at the core of First Amendment protection,
but even democratic participation such as "influenc[ing] a unit of government to take
a specific action."
220. See supra text accompanying note 35.
221. See, e.g., Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 659, 660 (1978) [hereinafter Political Boycott]. Although picketing and boy-
cott activities often overlap, this Article adopts the traditional definition of a boycott,
which includes as its two elements "the withholding of an economic relationship and
the inducement of others to do the same." Id. at 659.
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damages to include the cost of lost or damaged property [and]
... loss of profits or other consequential damages.2 22
Since the Model Act can be violated simply by convincing others
not to support the protected business entity, as shown in Part I
supra, it appears that an affected business can recover treble
damages for "loss of profits" due to interference with business
caused by a boycott, protest, or picket. Nor can the affected indus-
tries credibly dispute such a construction, as they have already
used the term "economic eco-terrorism" to describe boycott activ-
ity, such as the Earth Island Institute's call for consumers to boy-
cott tuna in order to protect dolphins.223
The Model Act's civil damages provision calls to mind the
damage award sought unsuccessfully by the plaintiffs in NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware.22 4 There, the local branch of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or-
ganized a long-term boycott of white merchants who engaged in
segregationist practices. Affected business owners sued the
NAACP and over one hundred individual defendants for profits
lost during the boycott and also sought injunctive relief.225 The
state chancery court awarded over $1.25 million to the business
owners and permanently enjoined the boycott.226 The Mississippi
Supreme Court reversed the chancellor on several issues, includ-
ing the applicability of secondary boycott laws, but upheld the
finding of liability. 227
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the business
owners could not make out a claim for damages unless they could
show that their financial losses were proximately caused by one of
the isolated incidents of violence that accompanied the otherwise
peaceable boycott. 228 To allow the business owners to recover for
the economic losses caused solely by the boycott itself, the Court
reasoned, would displace the boycotters' First Amendment rights,
since the boycott was staged by speeches and nonviolent picket-
ing.229 In other words, "speech does not lose its protected charac-
222. ALEC, supra note 6, § 4(D) (emphasis added).
223. See Paul Watson, ALF and ELF - Terrorism Is as Terrorism Does, in TER-
RORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS?, supra note 97, at 283.
224. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
225. Id. at 889-90.
226. Id. at 893.
227. Id. at 894.
228. Id. at 922-23.
229. Id. at 907.
308 [Vol. 22
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/3
PRIVATIZING THE PATRIOT ACT
ter" simply because a business profits suffer as a result.230 Even
where the boycott activity disrupts the market as a whole, the
Court held, a state's police power to regulate economic activity
must still defer to expression on public issues, which occupies the
"highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."231
The Model Act transgresses this important principle by im-
posing civil and criminal liability upon those who "obstruct" busi-
ness activity as a result of boycotts, nonviolent picketing, and
other protected speech acts. Moreover, the Model Act also violates
one of the key teachings of Claiborne Hardware: speech acts do
not lose their protection simply because they are accompanied by
episodes of violence. 232 The Model Act conflates speech with vio-
lent or destructive activity in two ways, regardless of whether
they are actually intertwined in the same event.
First, the Model Act's criminal penalties distinguish not by
the nature of the predicate activity, but only by the dollar amount
of adverse economic effects. 233 Accordingly, a handbilling or boy-
cott event that results in $501 of lost business is punishable by the
same felony sentence as an act of property damage that costs sev-
eral million dollars. By contrast, a 1963 civil rights boycott in Bir-
mingham, Alabama was estimated to have cost the targeted
businesses more than $750,000 a week.234
Second, the operative terms of the Model Act, as discussed in
Part II supra, are so vague and overbroad as to encompass both
destructive and peaceable activities. 235 Specifically, the Model
Act and its progeny forbid "obstructing" the favored business in-
terest by way of "coercion," "disruption," or "impeding. "236 This
interference, if "politically motivated," occurs anytime the actor
"influence [s] a unit of government to take a specific action or...
persuades the public to take specific action, or ... protest[s] the
actions of a unit of government, corporation, organization or the
230. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
231. Id. at 913 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). Regardless, the
Model Act's proponents do not argue that it is necessary to prevent broader-scale or
economy-wide market disruptions. See supra text accompanying note 93.
232. See also Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). Machesky is dis-
cussed supra in the text accompanying note 100.
233. The Model Act draws its felony/misdemeanor distinction where the protected
business interest suffers $500 worth of economic harm. See ALEC, supra note 6, § 4.
234. See Political Boycott, supra note 221, at 659 n.2.
235. See discussion supra Parts II.B and I.C.
236. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A).
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public at large."237 Obstruction as used in the Model Act can also
be accomplished via theft, property damage, and extortion.
238
In sum, the Model Act's failure to differentiate between de-
structive and peaceable activities, while punishing both with a
heavy hand, violates the rule of law established in Claiborne
Hardware.239 It seeks to get around this limitation by classifying
speech activity itself as terrorism. Moreover, the Model Act's im-
position of civil liability for the economic effects of boycott activity
flatly contradicts the holding of Claiborne Hardware and the polit-
ical boycott cases. Since the civil rights era, boycotts have become
"an increasingly important and powerful tool for advocates of so-
cial change. '240 It becomes especially crucial, in an era of corpo-
rate deregulation and underenforcement, 241 for legislatures and
courts to protect that avenue of influence.
4. Agricultural Disparagement Laws: Another Bite at
the Apple
In 1989, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) pub-
lished a report about the environmental and public health risks of
pesticides and other agricultural chemicals called Intolerable
Risk: Pesticides In Our Children's Food.242 The popular media,
including the news program 60 Minutes, hastily picked up on the
report, largely because of the report's conclusion that a chemical
commonly used on apples was unsafe. 243 Thereafter, sales of all
apples noticeably declined, whether or not the apples had been
237. Id. § 2(N).
238. See id. § 3(A).
239. It has been suggested that Claiborne Hardware cannot be reconciled with
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994), and other Supreme Court
decisions upholding injunctions and statutory constraints against abortion protest ac-
tivities. See Keleher, supra note 127, at 850-51. Generally, the abortion constraints
in the Madsen line of decisions were in the nature of place restrictions such as "buffer
zones" and injunctions against "blockades," see id., rather than the broad prescription
against all boycott activity that was invalidated in Claiborne Hardware and now res-
urrected in the Model Act. The seemingly limitless scope of the Model Act makes it
more akin to the boycott blackout. The Model Act in no way resembles either a time,
place, and manner restriction, as discussed supra in Part II, or a narrowly-tailored
injunction to a particular organization or location.
240. Political Boycott, supra note 221, at 659.
241. See supra text accompanying note 35.
242. Natural Resources Defense Council, Intolerable Risk: Pesticides In Our Chil-
dren's Food (1989).
243. See Jones, supra note 143, at 827 (citing Doug Haddix, Alar as a Media Event,
28 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 44, 44-45 (1990)).
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treated with Alar, the chemical in question. 244 At the same time,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began proceedings to
revoke Alar's pesticide registration, 245 ultimately concluding that
Alar is a "probable human carcinogen." 246
Although the eventual de-certification of Alar was no doubt a
boon to public health, the event was a sobering one for the food
processing, chemical, and agriculture industries, which lost mil-
lions of dollars in revenue as a result of consumers' reaction to the
report. Rather than amend their practices to be more protective of
public health, however, the affected industries instead attempted
to silence food safety advocates in the courts. Using the common
law tort of trade disparagement, the apple growers who lost reve-
nue after the Alar report sued CBS, three local CBS affiliates,
NRDC, and NRDC's media relations company in federal court for
lost profits.247
As the district judge pointed out, "[aipples had not received
such bad press since Genesis." 248 Nonetheless, to make out a
prima facie case for trade disparagement, the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate, among other things, that the statements about the
adverse effects of Alar were false.249 This element proved fatal to
the plaintiffs' claims, as they could not prove that the report was
244. See id. at 828 (noting that NRDC claimed that only 10-11 percent of apples
had actually been treated with Alar).
245. See id. at 827 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 47493 (1989)).
246. Id. at 830 (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THIRD PEER REVIEW
OF DAMINOZIDE AND ITS METABOLITE BREAKDOWN PRODUCT OF 1,1-DIMETHYHYDRAZIDE
24 (1991)).
247. See Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992). The
action was dismissed as to all but CBS, see id.; the District Court later granted CBS's
motion for summary judgment, see Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 836 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.
Wash. 1993), which was ultimately upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, see
Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (Auvil II). The trial court also
determined that the class of plaintiff apple growers lacked standing to bring suit, in
light of the report's "all-inclusive" treatment of apple growers. See Auvil, 800 F. Supp.
at 941. As the apple growers had already received over $250 million in subsidies from
the federal government to offset the effects of the Alar scare, see Auvil 11, 67 F.3d at
829, it is unlikely that the suit was brought simply to obtain compensation. More
plausibly, the agriculture industry recognized the potential of this legal approach to
counter environmentalists' increasing reliance upon scientific evidence of public
health dangers.
248. Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 942.
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977) ("Liability for Publication
of Injurious Falsehood - General Principle. One who publishes a false statement
harmful to the interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to
the other if (a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to inter-
ests of the other having pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that
it is likely to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless
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untrue, especially in light of the EPA's concurrent de-listing pro-
ceedings. 250 The trial court in Auvil, drawing upon a well-settled
body of First Amendment jurisprudence, held that the free speech
interests involved mandated a high burden of proof to demon-
strate falsity:
[a] news reporting service is not a scientific testing lab and
these services should be able to rely on a scientific government
report when they are relaying the report's results. The duty
plaintiffs propose would so chill debate that the freedom of
speech would be at risk.251
Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants' motions to dis-
miss and for summary judgment, all of which were affirmed on
appeal. 252
i. Rewriting Disparagement Law by Statute
Finding the common law burden of proof to be inhospitable,
agribusiness concerns, led by the American Feed Industry Associ-
ation, 253 then set out to lower their burden by statute. The result
was a model law that creates custom legal standards for dispar-
agement actions with respect to the agribusiness industry only.
254
To date, a majority of state legislatures have considered agricul-
disregard of its truth or falsity"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 651(1)(c) (1977).
250. See Auvil H, 67 F.3d at 821-22.
251. Auvil, 836 F. Supp. at 743 (see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986)).
252. See Auvil 1I, 67 F.3d at 816. The procedural history of Auvil is discussed
supra at note 247.
253. See Jones, supra note 143, at 832 (citing Libel Defense Resource Center, Agri-
cultural Disparagement Laws, LDRC BULLETIN 91-93 (1998)).
254. See id. Typical is Alabama's statute, which is based on the model law and
reads as follows:
§ 6-5-620. Legislative findings and intent. The Legislature hereby finds,
determines, and declares that the production of agricultural and aquacul-
tural food products and commodities constitute an important and signifi-
cant portion of the state economy and that it is imperative to protect the
vitality of the agricultural and aquacultural economy for the citizens of
this state by providing a cause of action for producers to recover damages
for the disparagement of any perishable product or commodity.
§ 6-5-621. Definitions. As used in this article, the following terms have
the following meanings: (1) Disparagement. The dissemination to the
public in any manner of false information that a perishable food product
or commodity is not safe for human consumption. The information shall
be deemed to be false if it is not based upon reasonable and reliable scien-
tific inquiry, facts, or data. (2) Perishable food product or Commodity.
Any agricultural or aquacultural food product which is sold or distributed
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/3
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tural disparagement bills,255 and thirteen states have passed
them.256 As scholars have pointed out, these laws modify the con-
stitutional and common law elements of disparagement 257 in
in a form that will perish or decay beyond marketability within a short
period of time.
§ 6-5-622. Cause of action. Any person who produces, markets, or sells a
perishable food product or commodity, and suffers damage as a result of
another person's disparagement of perishable food products or commodi-
ties has a cause of action for damages and for any other relief a court of
competent jurisdiction deems appropriate, including but not limited to,
compensatory and punitive damages.
§ 6-5-623. Lack of knowledge or intent no defense. It is no defense under
this article that the actor did not intend, or was unaware of, the act
charged.
§ 6-5-624. Statute of limitations. Any civil action for damages for dispar-
agement of perishable agricultural or aquacultural food products or com-
modities shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action
accrues.
§ 6-5-625. Construction. This article shall be construed in pari materia
with all laws relating to fraud, criminal mischief, criminal tampering
with property, interruption of or impairing commerce and trade, unlawful
trade practices, and property damage.
ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-620 to -625 (2004).
255. Over thirty other state legislatures have entertained such bills. See Jones,
supra note 143, at 823 n.3 (citing H.B. 1938, 82d Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999); S.B. 492, Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1995); A.B. 558, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); H.B. 1176, 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.
1991); S. 311, Leg. Sess. (Del. 1991); S. 234, 89th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995);
H.R. 106, 76th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1995); H.R. 389, 77th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Iowa 1997); S.B. 937, 1st Leg. Sess. (Me. 1997); S. 445, Leg. Sess. (Md. 1996); S.
34 (Md. 1997); S. 937, Leg. Sess. (Mass. 1997); H.R. 5808, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
1995); H.R. 4660, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); H.R. 2804, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 1994); H.R. 1720, 87th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1994); H.R. 923, 89th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998); L.B. 367, 94th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1995); H.R. 175, 95th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Neb. 1997); H.R. 1105, Leg. Sess. (N.H. 1997); H.R. 5159, 205th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1992); H.B. 1192, 54th Leg. Sess. (N.D. 1995); H.R. 949, 179th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995); H.R. 2731, 178th Gen. Assem. (Pa. 1993); S. 160, State-
wide Sess. (S.C. 1995); H.R. 4706, Statewide Sess. (S.C. 1994); H.R. 735 Adjourned
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 1996); H.R. 690, Leg., 65th Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 1997); H.R. 1098, 54th
Leg. Sess. (Wash. 1995); A.B. 702, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1995); H.R. 308, 53d
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1995), H.R. 127, 54th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1997)).
256. See Eric Jan Hansum, Where's The Beef? A Reconciliation of Commercial
Speech and Defamation Cases in the Context of Texas's Agricultural Disparagement
Law, 19 REV. LITIG. 261, 263 (2000) (citing ALA. CODE § 6-5-620 to -625 (Michie Supp.
1998); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113 (West Supp. 1998); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 35-31-01
(Bradford Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. § 865.065 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-1 to -4
(Michie Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 6-2001 to -2003 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 3:4501-4504 (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 69-1-251 to -257 (West
Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-44-01 to -04 (Michie Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.81 (Anderson Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3010 -3012 (West
Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-10A-1 to -4 (Michie 1995); TEx. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 96.001-004 (Vernon 1997)).
257. Commentators warn that although the defamation standard established in
New York Times v. Sullivan would appear to govern product and trade disparagement
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three ways: (1) by lowering or removing the defendant's requisite
intent; (2) by doing away with the "of and concerning" require-
ment; and (3) by lowering the plaintiffs burden of proof.25 8
First, several of the agricultural disparagement laws contra-
vene the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan that a defamation
plaintiff must show that the defendant made the statement with
actual malicious intent.25 9 Without such a showing, the Supreme
Court held, the defendant's "constitutional guarantees" of free
speech are placed in harm's way.260 In other words, the defen-
dant's statement must be made "with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."261 To
the contrary, several of the disparagement laws require only that
the defendant have acted negligently, 262 or they omit an intent
cases, the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the issue. See Jones, supra
note 143, at 838. Nonetheless, there remains "a strong argument for applying the
criteria of defamation cases to food disparagement actions given the similarities be-
tween defamation and disparagement law." Hansum, supra note 256, at 267. Defa-
mation, of course, addresses threats to one's reputation, while disparagement
concerns one's economic interests. Id. at 268. If anything, disparagement law should
embody a more speech-protective standard, given that "[i]t is not entirely clear that
the U.S. Constitution should afford the same degree of protection to making a profit
as it does to protecting a person's reputation." Id. at 269. Other commentators note
that courts have begun to graft the legal standards for defamation onto disparage-
ment suits, thus "constitutionalizing" them. See Margot S. Fell, Note, Agricultural
Disparagement Statutes: Tainted Beef, Tainted Speech, and Tainted Law, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 981, 1001-02 (1999) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 195-97 (1st Cir. 1982), affd 466 U.S.
485, 513 (1984)). In sum, all of the constitutional protections established in New York
Times have been applied to disparagement cases "in some capacity." Id. at 1007.
258. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 143; David J. Bederman et al., Of Banana Bills
and Veggie Hate Crimes: The Constitutionality of Agricultural Disparagement Stat-
utes, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (1997); Megan W. Semple, Veggie Libel Meets Free
Speech: A Constitutional Analysis of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 15 VA. ENVTL.
L. J. 403 (1995).
259. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Actual malice is
required for speech involving matters of public concern, regardless of whether the
plaintiff is a private citizen or a public figure, if the plaintiff seeks punitive damages.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). It goes without saying that
food safety is a matter of public concern. Furthermore, it is possible that agricultural
disparagement plaintiffs, such as Paul Engler, the lead plaintiff in Texas Beef Group,
could be construed as at least "limited purpose" public figures. See Fell, supra note
257, at 1027.
260. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
261. Id.
262. See Jones, supra note 143, at 838 (citing FLA. STAT. § 865.065 (West Supp.
1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1) (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.81 (West Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3010 to -3012 (West Supp.
1996)).
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requirement altogether. 263 This relaxes the intent standard far
below what is constitutionally required.
Second, the disparagement laws flout constitutional require-
ments that the statement at issue is about or somehow refers to
the plaintiff. In New York Times, for instance, an Alabama police
commissioner brought a defamation action regarding a political
advertisement that did not mention him by name, but that, he as-
serted, implicated him nonetheless because of its references to po-
lice conduct.264 The Supreme Court held that the commissioner's
claim was "constitutionally deficient" because the evidence failed
to support the jury's finding that the advertisement was "of and
concerning" the commissioner.265
The disparagement statutes manipulate the "of and concern-
ing" requirement by explicitly conferring standing upon entities
about whom the statement may not be "of and concerning." For
instance, some state statutes include not only producers, but also
marketers, sellers, shippers, and even trade associations. 266 By
contrast, in Auvil, the court found that even among a group of pro-
ducers, many lacked standing because the statements about Alar
were not "of and concerning" those growers who did not use Alar,
but rather, were "wide-ranging" statements about the chemical
generally. 267 The disparagement laws, on the other hand, do not
base the right of action on the relationship between the plaintiff
and the statement, as constitutionally required, but instead re-
quire the party to show only that it belongs to one of the broad
industry-based categories set forth in the statute.268 By creating
per se categories of standing, the laws negate the "of and concern-
ing" requirement, thereby violating the First Amendment protec-
tions set forth in New York Times.
Finally, some of the agricultural disparagement laws upset
the burden of proof, which in defamation and product disparage-
ment actions is traditionally placed upon the plaintiff.269 Louisi-
ana's statute, for instance, creates a presumption of falsity unless
263. Id. (citing ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-625, 6-5-623 (1998)).
264. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288-89.
265. Id. at 288.
266. Arizona, Florida, North Dakota, and Ohio extend standing to trade associa-
tions. See Hansum, supra note 256.
267. Nor could the growers premise standing on the fact that they were damaged
by consumer perceptions about apples generally. See Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 945.
268. See Hansum, supra note 256.
269. See Fell, supra note 257, at 990 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 558
(1977)).
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the defendant can show that the statement was "based upon rea-
sonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data."270 Given
the inherent subjectivity as to which data is "reasonable," poten-
tial defendants will not know in advance whether the science upon
which their claims rest, even if it is peer-reviewed and objectively
verifiable, is sufficient to insulate them from disparagement
claims. This may pose due process problems as well, 271 and is a
far cry from the "convincing clarity" standard of proof established
in New York Times.272
Although courts have not yet explicitly deemed any of the ag-
ricultural disparagement laws unconstitutional, commentators
"overwhelmingly" predict that the statutes would not survive an
express constitutional challenge.27 3 The paucity of litigation may
indicate that potential plaintiffs are aware of the laws' constitu-
tional infirmities. In fact, plaintiff businesses and trade associa-
tions have invoked the agricultural disparagement laws only five
times. 274 The most well-known of these episodes occurred in 1996,
when the Texas Beef Group and a class of others sued Oprah Win-
frey and others under the Texas agricultural disparagement
law. 27 5
At issue was Ms. Winfrey's statement, made during a broad-
cast of her show, that information relayed by one of her guests
about Mad Cow Disease and cattle ranching practices "has just
stopped me cold from eating another burger."276 Rather than ad-
dress the constitutionality of the state law, the District Court in-
stead granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on the
grounds that cows are not "perishable food products" within the
meaning of the statute, and that Ms. Winfrey had not "knowingly"
disparaged the plaintiffs.27 7 Although the Texas Beef Group court
passed on the constitutional question, it nonetheless stated that
courts "[have] expressly refused to recognize causes of action that
270. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502 (West 2005).
271. See Semple, supra note 258, at 440.
272. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
273. Jones, supra note 143, at 833.
274. Of these, only two have been reported, according to commentators who have
surveyed the case law. See id. at 842. Besides the Oprah Winfrey case, see also Ac-
tion for a Clean Env't. v. Georgia, 457 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 1995) (dismissing declaratory
judgment action as to the statute's constitutionality for lack of ripeness).
275. See Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
276. See Fell, supra note 257, at 1010 (citing Am. Compl., Texas Beef Group v.
Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 1998)).
277. See Texas Beef Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 863, affd 201 F.3d 680, 689-90 (5th
Cir. 2000).
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merely duplicate the remedy of defamation and are creatively pled
in an attempt to avoid the constitutional protections mandated by
the First Amendment."278
ii. Comparison to the Model Act
The agricultural disparagement laws' attempts to shortcut
the First Amendment, so roundly admonished by legal scholars as
well as the Texas Beef Group court in dicta, surface again in the
Model Act. First, with regard to the intent element, recall that
the Model Act criminalizes the taking of photographs on the prem-
ises of an animal enterprise, even upon lawful entry, if the photog-
rapher has "the intent to ... defame the facility or its owner."279
By criminalizing the intent to defame itself, rather than establish-
ing strict state of mind requirements, such as actual malice, the
Model Act fundamentally uproots the entire concept of defama-
tion. Defamation has never been premised on a vague and circu-
lar standard such as the "intent to defame." As in some of the
agricultural disparagement statutes, no real intent standard, such
as actual malice, is established in the Model Act. That courts
have construed the mens rea requirement in such an exacting
fashion in the First Amendment context is no accident. Rather,
the actual malice standard has been deliberately established as a
high hurdle so as to be more speech-protective. 280
Additionally, the Model Act manipulates the burden of proof,
not by shifting it to the defendant per se, but rather by basing it
upon the complainant's or a third-party listener's subjective per-
ception of the prohibited activity's effects. The Model Act's pri-
mary operative passage prohibits "depriving" the business
interest of certain economic interests "by way of ... fear."28 1 Like
many terms in the Model Act, "fear" is not defined. Nonetheless,
criminal sanctions will be imposed on the speaker if the complain-
ant alleges that the speech acts caused him "fear."
278. Id. at 864.
279. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(2)(e).
280. Additionally, as with several of the agricultural disparagement laws, the
Model Act provides for punitive damages in the defamation context without imposing
the constitutionally required intent element of malice. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 143
(citing Bruce E.H. Johnson & Eric M. Stahl, Food Disparagement: An Overview of the
Constitutional Issues, LDRC BULLETIN 34 (1998)). Recall also that New York Times
heightened the intent standard for public figures above what was required at common
law. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
281. ALEC, supra note 6, § 3(A)(1).
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Fear, as explained in Part II.C, may be the most idiosyncratic
and varied of all human responses. One person may find a
handbiller, or even the very sound of someone's voice, to be fear-
some, while another would not flinch even in the face of violent
threats. The Model Act leaves it to the guesswork of the courts,
and of potentially affected parties, to ascertain how a complainant
would meet her burden of proving fear. Unlike self-defense, sex-
ual harassment, sexual assault and other crimes and defenses
that operate based on an actor's demonstrated fear, the predicate
acts prohibited by the Model Act need not be criminal or injurious
in nature. Without such a predicate criminal act, the legitimacy of
allegations brought under the Model Act is harder for prosecutors
and judges to verify. Finally, the Model Act's most conspicuous
corruption of the defamation doctrine is that it brings defamation
into the province of criminal law for the first time.
Not surprisingly, the agricultural disparagement statutes
and eco-terror bills emanate from the same place. Both were pre-
mised on a Model Act drafted and circulated by the trade associa-
tions of affected industries. Some of the trade associations that
advocated for the disparagement laws are the same entities now
pushing the eco-terror bills. Here as there, "[slilencing critics of
agricultural products is the primary goal."28 2 The Model Act and
the disparagement statutes both "creat[e] a new right - the right
to produce a consumer good without public discourse"28 3 about ei-
ther its safety, its environmental impacts, or its ethical considera-
tions. Generally, the two approaches share a remarkable
resemblance, except that the Model Act seeks to proscribe a
broader range of speech and impose more severe penalties.
Critics of the agricultural disparagement laws ask why agri-
culture deserves favored treatment: "[ilf impact on the economy is
the test for whether to pass protectionist legislation. . . Michigan
could pass an Automobile Defamation Act or Louisiana could
quash debate about petro-chemical industries."28 4 The Model Act
is even more of an exercise in bald favoritism than the agricul-
tural disparagement laws, which benefited any "agricultural prod-
uct," animal or plant. 28 5 Within the agricultural sector, the Model
282. Jones, supra note 143, at 856 (citing RONALD E. GOTS, Toxic RIsKs: SCIENCE,
REGULATION, AND PERCEPTION 254 (1993)).
283. Id. at 845.
284. Id. at 846.
285. Also missing from the Model Act is the assertion, set forth in the preamble of
many of the agricultural disparagement statutes, that protectionism for certain busi-
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Act focuses on animal producers. In sum, it should be obvious
that the Model Act targets many of the same actors as the agricul-
tural disparagement laws. This time, its proponents use the spec-
ter of terrorism to justify a second, and larger, bite at the apple.
C. Criminal Prosecution of Speech in the Name of
Private Business Interests
By criminalizing speech and associational acts solely for the
protection of private business interests, the Model Act eludes cate-
gorization in any of the doctrines explored heretofore. Rather, the
Model Act creates its own doctrinal category, hastily obscuring im-
portant historical and legal boundaries. Historically, the harsh
criminal sanctions it authorizes have been reserved for threats to
the very existence of the nation-state, and even those laws are
some of the most "widely regretted"286 in our nation's legal his-
tory. Moreover, to the extent that it borrows certain legal stan-
dards from the doctrines, such as third-party liability, the "illegal
objective" test, and certain burdens of proof, it misuses them.
Is the perversion of such a hard-fought doctrine worth the
payoff? It depends who you ask. Opportunistic business interests
are certainly aware of their opponents' limited financial ability to
litigate or defend under any of the theories explored above. As one
critic of the agricultural disparagement laws noted, "[ml any of the
potential defendants under [the laws] are non-profit groups ....
They do not have the budget to combat a claim brought by a pow-
erful agricultural conglomerate."28 7 Put another way, not every-
one, or perhaps anyone, has the resources of Oprah Winfrey. The
mere threat of liability, or even the cost of litigation, would cer-
tainly intimidate would-be speakers into self-censorship about im-
portant issues that deserve to be a matter of public discourse.
Advocacy groups of all stripes "rel[y] on the First Amendment
to pursue [their] goals and survive." 28 8 In the modem pluralist
political state, dominated by special interest groups, courts and
legislatures must be alert not only of attempts by the government
to abridge free speech, but also of the suppressive and constitu-
ness interests is crucial to the health of the state's entire economy. See Jones, supra
note 143, at 845-46 (citing ALA. CODE § 6-5-620 to -622).
286. Flynn, supra note 179, at 1018.
287. Fell, supra note 257, at 1022 (noting that the financial concern is not recipro-
cal because the statutes are constructed in such a way to allow plaintiffs to share
legal costs among a broad class of affected business entities).
288. Keleher, supra note 127, at 83.
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tionally suspect efforts of rival interests.289 As the Supreme Court
stated forcefully in Thornhill v. Alabama, "the group in power at
any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and
truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on a show-
ing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsis-
tent with its interests."290
IV. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF AN
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC USA PATRIOT ACT
Its flaunting of legal orthodoxies aside, the Model Act, if suc-
cessful, will also have profound policy implications that reach far
beyond the extremists it purports to focus on. By expanding anti-
terror laws into venues where even the drafters admit there is no
violence or "terror," the Model Act exploits the rhetoric behind the
USA Patriot Act to catalyze fear where no real threat exists. In so
doing, its proponents manage only to distract and detract from
true terrorism prevention. Notwithstanding this serious side ef-
fect, other industries with vocal political opponents are no doubt
also watching the Model Act closely, in the event that they choose
to follow suit with custom-tailored legislation of their own. Fi-
nally, the Model Act's chilling effects upon journalists, as well as
activists of all causes, merit serious reflection.
A. Exploiting and Expanding the Rhetoric of the USA
Patriot Act
Given the wide-ranging and extreme consequences of the
Model Act, it seems fair to ask why legislators, including those
aligned with ALEC, would give it serious consideration. In the
wake of the September 11 attacks, the terrorism trope virtually
guarantees that these laws will get further in the legislative pro-
cess than they would otherwise, or than they deserve to. Those
who dare to question the effectiveness or constitutionality of these
laws, or anything labeled anti-terrorism are derided as anti-patri-
ots and even terrorist-sympathizers. 291 Although many states
and cities, as explained above, have retrospectively expressed con-
289. See id.
290. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
291. Indeed, some members of Congress hastily jumped to the conclusion that
animal rights activists were responsible for the September 11th attacks. See Denise
R. Case, The USA Patriot Act: Adding Bite to the Fight Against Animal Rights Terror-
ism? 34 RUTGERS L. J. 187, 218 (2002) (noting the remarks of Congressman Don
Young).
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cern about laws like the USA Patriot Act, these were highly un-
popular sentiments at the time of the law's passage, and have not
yet resulted in any legislative rollback.
However, as we have seen, the Model Act actually has very
little if anything to do with "terrorism," and is better understood
as an economic protectionism law. Its appropriation of the term
terrorism is not made with genuine concern about the safety of the
"civilian populace," 292 but to guarantee minimal resistance to a
law with substantial First Amendment problems. Other anti-ter-
ror laws, by contrast, are based not solely on the content of the
message, but also on the means by which the actor targets the
populace or the state.293 That the rhetoric and legal devices of the
USA Patriot Act have begun to surface in venues far removed
from the actual war on terror demonstrates that the USA Patriot
Act is no longer viewed, if it ever was, as merely an emergency
response to an unthinkable tragedy. Rather, measures like the
Model Act may help the USA Patriot Act and the oppressive re-
gime it supports to acquire normalcy, even permanency, in our
modern imagination.
B. Distracting from Efforts to Bring True Terrorists to
Justice
Given the breadth and variety of actual terrorist threats to
human health and safety, it is foolish to deploy anti-terror re-
sources and rhetoric against a movement with no violent acts to
its credit and a strict non-violent code. 294 Many domestic groups
with a lengthy history of violent terrorist behavior remain at
large, but none have been made the express object of a particular
statute the way the Model Act focuses on environmental activists.
Extremist factions of the anti-abortion movement, for example,
are responsible for at least seven murders and hundreds of violent
292. 18 U.S.C. § 1331(5). Under the traditional definition of terror, the terrorist
must target the civilian populace as a whole, or have evil designs upon the very work-
ings of government. See id.
293. See NTSTER AM. JUR. 2D Terrorism § 15 (2004).
294. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 69. Although proponents of the
bills argue that "eco-terror" is a growing problem, it bears noting that the chief of
domestic terrorism analysis for the FBI stated that "we have not seen a dramatic
increase in the numbers of [eco-related property damage] incidents ... maybe four or
five" in as many years, "nothing widespread." Bob Ortega, Media Go to Him for Anal-
ysis of Environmental Violence the FBI Hasn't Spotted, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at
Al. Moreover, the National Association of Attorneys General stated that "the issue of
eco-terrorism 'hasn't come up."' Id.
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attacks on clinic workers and volunteers in North America. 295
One can only speculate why legislatures have not appropriated
the word "terrorism" to describe these lethal crimes, or why Con-
gress has convened hearings on the specter of animal rights "ter-
rorism," but not on the far more violent anti-abortion movement.
In a single year, for example, anti-abortion extremists were re-
sponsible for 483 lethal or violent incidents against abortion prov-
iders in the U.S. alone. 296
Militant anti-choice activists are not the only domestic terror-
ist threat. In a recent New York Times column, Paul Krugman
reminds us of the ever-present danger of well-armed, clandestine
right-wing militias, many with white supremacist ties.297 In
April, 2003, Krugman recounts, federal agents stumbled across
"what appears to have been a horrifying terrorist plot" in the
Texas home of a white supremacist - a seemingly limitless cache
of weapons including fully automatic firearms, remote-controlled
explosives, and a cyanide bomb big enough to detonate a large
building.298 Although accused terrorist Jose Padilla possessed no
such bomb-making material, "Mr. Ashcroft put him on front pages
around the world. '299 The Texas event, meanwhile, made no
headlines, perhaps because Ashcroft wanted "to bury news about
terrorists who don't fit his preferred story line ... it's hard to be-
lieve that [the Texas would-be bomber] wouldn't have been a
household name if he had been a Muslim, or even a leftist."30 0
Even after the Texas incident, the Bush administration persisted
in its view that eco-activists were still the "country's leading do-
mestic terrorist threat."30 1 Laws like the Model Act clearly "neg-
lect[ ] real threats to the public because of . . . ideological
biases."30 2
A final anecdote illustrates the need for a more nuanced con-
cept of what truly comprises "terrorism." Over twenty years ago,
in central Oregon, followers of the Rajneeshee cult planted salmo-
295. See Keleher, supra note 127 at 844-45; see also National Abortion Federation,
NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics, at http://www.prochoice.org (last visited Jan.
31, 2004).
296. National Abortion Federation, History of Violence / Extreme Violence, at http:/
/www.prochoice.org/about-abortion/violence/history-extreme.asp (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
297. Paul Krugman, Noonday in the Shade, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A19.
298. See id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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nella bacteria in a restaurant salad bar, in an effort to skew the
town election in favor of their leader, by making town citizens too
sick to vote the following day. 30 3 A district attorney also became
ill "after leaving a cup of coffee unattended while Rajneeshees
lurked around the courthouse." 30 4 Overall, forty-five people were
sickened. This unlikely plot, almost humorous in its bizarre and
relatively modest origins, actually stands as the largest "bioterror
attack" on U.S. soil to date. In the days since Rajneeshees
"lurked" around salad bars in Oregon, the term "terrorism" has
become an all-purpose epithet. It has been so diluted and misused
that it has little function left, other than to arouse fear and suspi-
cion. The Model Act contributes to this dilution by labeling non-
violent speech acts as terror, which in turn impairs the ability of
adjudicators to ascertain what is truly terrorism. By diverting
law enforcement resources to non-violent actors, the Model Act ul-
timately hinders violence prevention.
C. Testing a Model Corporate Strategy for Other
Industries
The Model Act has sobering implications for activists of all
causes that scrutinize the actions of private business entities. Its
framework can be quickly borrowed by other industries that seek
protection from the effects of public criticism, including enter-
prises with controversial labor practices such as sweatshops, com-
panies that outsource jobs, the biotechnology sector, defense
contractors, nuclear plants, tobacco companies, weapons manufac-
turers, the fast food industry, and a host of others - perhaps even
the financial sector, in the wake of the corporate accountability
backlash.
Many of these industries are sponsors of ALEC, the Model
Act's drafter.30 5 With publicly-unaccountable structures like
ALEC in place to serve as the unregulated mediator between af-
fected business interests and eager right-wing legislators, the con-
cept could spread quickly. Commentators also predicted a similar
spillover effect with regard to the agricultural disparagement
laws. One scholar warned that if "other industries demand[ed]
303. John Cramer, Oregon Suffered Largest Bioterrorist Attack in U.S. History, 20
Years Ago, THE BULL. (Bend, Or.), Oct. 14, 2001.
304. Id.
305. See Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 30.
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similar protection," it would "severely undercut the ability of any
news agency to point out a calamity waiting to happen."30 6
Even if other businesses with controversial practices do not
actively seek such legal protection from public scrutiny, the Model
Act itself has the potential to reach activists of other causes. Its
prohibitions include interference with not only those activities
that would traditionally be recognized as objectionable by animal
protectionists, such as hunting, but also those that may or may
not involve the use of animals, such as "clothing or garment man-
ufacturing."30 7 The Model Act even prohibits interference with ac-
tivities that do not appear to be related to animal use whatsoever,
such as "camping" and "traveling."308 If the proponents' objectives
are truly to stop so-called "eco-terror," this sweeping list of pro-
tected activities is wildly overinclusive.
D. Effects on Journalism, Activism, and the Very
Concept of the Social Movement
As we have seen, the law implicates not only the ski-mask-
wearing animal liberator, but also every American who sends the
ASPCA or the Sierra Club a ten dollar check, and hence provides
"material support" to a terrorist organization. Proponents of the
bills can no longer credibly state that they are not going after law-
abiding activists. Every mainstream animal and environmental
protection organization in this country has cause to worry about
the Model Act's wide-ranging institutional liability provision. In-
deed, many organizations have already begun to worry, and are
working to defeat the bills, 30 9 so that they may carry on with their
non-violent advocacy activities without fear of prosecution.
Journalists, as it happens, will also be hit hard by the Model
Act, especially under the felony photography provision.310 The
Auvil and Texas Beef Group agricultural disparagement cases hint
at what is to come for journalists under the Model Act - expensive,
protracted litigation, and now, possibly even criminal liability.
306. Hansum, supra note 256, at 270.
307. ALEC, supra note 6, § 2(B). See also ABCNY, supra note 34, at 1.
308. ALEC, supra note 6, § 2(B). See also ABCNY, supra note 34, at 1-2.
309. Wayne Pacelle, chief executive officer of the Humane Society of the United
States, said of the Model Act: "We agree with the criticisms of those who resort to
violence in the name of animal protection. But we don't want to allow political oppo-
nents of animal and environmental protection to leverage legitimate societal concerns
about terrorism in order to institute indefensible restrictions on non-violent and long-
permissible forms of dissent." Satchell, supra note 60, at 1.
310. See supra Part I.B.
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The lack of a journalist exception in the felony photography provi-
sion is no accident. An undercover report can have devastating
economic effects, regardless of whether it is motivated by ideology
or ratings. But these economic interests, as this Article has illus-
trated, are insufficiently compelling to justify the state's restric-
tion on this type of journalistic activity. In fact, society as a whole
often benefits from the meaningful and often overdue legislative
reforms triggered by undercover media reports. 311
By silencing both activists and journalists, the Model Act
grossly distorts the important public policy debate surrounding
human interactions with animals and the environment. Its over-
reaching prohibitions leave animal and environmental protection-
ists with very few if any means to communicate their message
without fear of prosecution. Restraints of this breadth truly do
have the potential to render entire movements ineffective. Where
one side of the debate is so profoundly hindered, the debate effec-
tively ends. In the vacuum of meaningful public discourse and vi-
brant exchange of views, the affected business interests substitute
their viewpoint as a foregone conclusion. Through its deliberate
refusal to distinguish between destructive and peaceful activity,
the Model Act has the rhetorical effect of characterizing what is
actually a majority-held opinion 312 not only as a minority view-
311. Examples of such benefits are too numerous to list. However, a recent event
illustrates the point. On July 20, 2004, undercover investigators released videos of
employees at Kentucky Fried Chicken's contract growers "tearing beaks off, ripping a
bird's head off to write graffiti in blood, spitting tobacco juice into birds' mouths,
plucking feathers to 'make it snow,' suffocating a chicken by tying a latex glove over
its head, and squeezing birds like water balloons to spray feces over other birds."
Donald J. McNeil, Jr., KFC Supplier Accused of Animal Cruelty, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2004, at C2. This media event is notable in that it has sparked an effort in Congress
to amend the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act to include birds. See, e.g., The Hu-
mane Soc'y of the United States, Petition for Poultry, at https://community.hsus.org/
campaign/petitionjfor-poultry (last visited Apr. 26, 2005). Prior to this media scru-
tiny, most people were unaware that Federal law does not require birds to be slaugh-
tered humanely. Yet the Model Act would have criminalized the taking and release of
those videos as a felony.
312. Independent polls of a nationwide scope repeatedly and unequivocally show
that most Americans favor better treatment of animals and stronger protection for
the environment. See, e.g., S. Plous, Attitudes Toward the Use of Animals: In Psycho-
logical Research and Education: Results From a National Survey of Psychologists, 51
AM. PSYCHOL. 1167-80 (1996) (noting that even among researchers, support for
animal research declined between 81 and 53 percent, depending on the species, when
the research involved confinement, pain, or death); Lake Snell Perry Mermin & Asso-
ciates, AMERICANS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF 1,000 REGIS-
TERED VOTERS (Washington, D.C., Mar. 23, 1999) (finding that 77 percent of American
citizens are troubled by the inhumane treatment of animals killed for food); Yale
Univ. School of Forestry & Env't, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFICIT: SURVEY ON AMERICAN
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point, but as the radical propaganda of a violent minority. How-
ever, as Justice Stevens warned in Claiborne Hardware, using a
metaphor that suits the present debate, "[a] court must be wary of
a claim that the true color of a forest is better revealed by reptiles
hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless free-standing
trees."31
3
Nor should the effects of debate distortion on the listener go
unvalued. By pre-empting a message that the listener may ulti-
mately choose to act upon, the Model Act, at best, undervalues the
listener's intellectual autonomy, and at worst, interferes with her
control over her own analytical processes.3 14 One wonders why
the affected business interests would resort to re-contouring the
First Amendment rather than answering critics with their own
speech. Without persuasive counterarguments, however, it helps
to have the entire debate floor to one's self.315
Lost in all of the paranoia about terrorism is the boundless
irony that the law would ever recognize as "eco-terrorists" those
who endeavor to protect the ecosystem. In the shadow of the
Model Act, the real victims of "intimidation, coercion, [and] fear"
are the vast number of Americans who value the protection of ani-
mals and the environment, and who express those values in any
fashion other than keeping that thought to themselves. Each time
ATTITUDES ON THE ENVIRONMENT (2004) (finding that 67 percent of Americans believe
that the U.S. government does not do enough to address environmental degradation),
available at http://www.yale.edu/forestry/downloads/yale-poll-globalwarming.pdf.
313. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982).
314. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 334.
315. This technique - slandering the messenger as a terrorist rather than rebut-
ting the substance of her message - was on vivid display during the February 20,
2004 episode of Dateline. There, Veronica Atkins, the widow of the man who invented
the Atkins diet, compared a pro-vegetarian public health advocacy group directly to
the Taliban. The "terrorist" activity to which she objected was the lawful obtaining
and then publicizing of a report indicating that Dr. Atkins weighed 258 pounds at the
time of his death. See Patrick Whittle, Vegetarians Chew the Fat Over the Atkins Diet,
HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.), Feb. 23, 2004.
This approach is relatively new, as evinced by the recent public outcry over cruel
acts propagated at KFC contractors' factory farms, see supra note 311. After the me-
dia expos6, a spokesperson from KFC stated that PETA's use of billboards condemn-
ing the conditions and urging a boycott constituted "corporate terrorist activities" that
"won't be tolerated." Carol Beggy & Mark Shanahan, A Fond Memory of Fay Wray; A
Not-So-Fond Charge by Pam Anderson, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 2004, at D2. Clearly,
affected industries and their supporters are turning up the heat. Just two years ago,
one commentator cited PETA's use of a billboard as a "a good example of animal
rights activists' methods of using the First Amendment." See Case, supra note 291, at
227. First, they point to billboards as a constructive outlet for disapproving senti-
ment, then they decry the use of billboards as terrorism. Purveyors of the "eco-terror"
phantasm cannot have it both ways.
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an American cuts a check to a mainstream environmental organi-
zation, or writes her congressperson, or attends a meeting, or
passes out flyers, she will do so knowing that the only things keep-
ing her out of jail and off the public terrorist registry are chance,
and the present mood of her local law enforcement agents. Such
repressive governance has not been seen since the Espionage Acts
and the Red Scare, and even then, it was thought that the re-
pressed actors posed a threat to the very nation-state itself.
Among these shameful moments in our legal history, the Model
Act truly symbolizes the "worst of times."316
316. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 513 (1985).
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